
Geopolitical risk dashboard
BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator
The global BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) aims to capture overall market attention to geopolitical risks, as the line chart shows. The indicator is a simple average of our top-10 risks.
Top 10 risks by likelihood
We see the geopolitical environment shaped by forces that are together driving a wholesale reordering of global political and economic relationships. These include rising trade protectionism, increased government interventions in markets, heightened global competition, ongoing efforts to resolve regional conflicts and an intensifying AI race.
Sources: BlackRock Investment Institute. Views and data as of September 2025. Notes: The “risks” column lists the 10 key geopolitical risks that we track. The “description” column defines each risk. “Attention score” reflects the BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) for each risk. The BGRI measures the degree of the market’s attention to each risk, as reflected in brokerage reports and financial media. See the "how it works" section on p.7 for details. The table is sorted by the “Likelihood” column which represents our fundamental assessment, based on BlackRock’s subject matter experts, of the probability that each risk will be realized – either low, medium or high – in the near term. The “our view” column represents BlackRock’s most recent view on developments related to each risk. This is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds or security in particular. Individual portfolio managers for BlackRock may have opinions and/or make investment decisions that may, in certain respects, not be consistent with the information contained herein.
Comparing market movements and attention
We have developed a market movement score for each risk that measures the degree to which asset prices have moved similarly to our risk scenarios, integrating insights from our Risk & Quantitative Analysis (RQA) team and their Market-Driven Scenario (MDS) shocks. We do this by estimating how “similar” the current market environment is to our expectation of what it would look like in the event the particular MDS was realized, also taking into account the magnitude of market moves. The far right of the horizontal axis indicates that the similarity between asset movements and what our MDS assumed is greatest; the middle of the axis means asset prices have shown little relationship to the MDS, and the far left indicates markets have behaved in the opposite way that our MDS anticipated.
Risk map
BlackRock Geopolitical market attention, market movement and likelihood
Selected scenario variables
How to gauge the potential market impact of each of our top-10 risks? We have identified three key “scenario variables” for each – or assets that we believe would be most sensitive to a realization of that risk. The chart below shows the direction of our assumed price impact.
| Risk | Asset | Direction of assumed price impact |
|---|---|---|
| Global trade protectionism | U.S. specialty retail & distribution | |
| U.S. consumer durables & apparel | ||
| U.S. two-year Treasury | ||
| Middle East regional war | Brent crude oil | |
| VIX | ||
| U.S. high yield credit | ||
| U.S.-China strategic competition | Taiwanese dollar | |
| Taiwanese equities | ||
| China high yield | ||
| Global technology decoupling | Chinese yuan | |
| Chinese semiconductors | ||
| U.S. semiconductors and electrical equipment | ||
| Major cyber attack(s) | U.S. high yield utilities | |
| U.S. dollar | ||
| U.S. utilities sector | ||
| Major terror attack(s) | Germany 10-year government bond | |
| Japanese yen | ||
| Europe airlines sector | ||
| Russia-NATO conflict | Russian equities | |
| Russian ruble | ||
| Brent crude oil | ||
| Emerging markets political crisis | Latin America consumer staples sector | |
| Emerging vs. developed equities | ||
| Brazil debt | ||
| North Korea conflict | Japanese yen | |
| Korean won | ||
| Korean equities | ||
| European fragmentation | EMEA hotels & leisure | |
| Italy 10-year government bond | ||
| Russian ruble |
Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, with data from BlackRock’s Aladdin Portfolio Risk Tools application, September 2025. Notes: The table depicts the three assets that we see as key variables for each of our top-10 geopolitical risks – as well as the direction of the assumed shocks for each in the event of the risk materializing. The up arrow indicates a rise in prices (corresponding to a decline in yields for bonds); the down arrow indicates a fall in prices. Our analysis is based on similar historical events and current market conditions such as volatility and cross-asset correlations. See the “implied stress testing framework” section of the 2018 paper Market-Driven Scenarios: An Approach for Plausible Scenario Construction for details. For illustrative purposes only. The scenarios are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving. This material represents an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds, strategy or security in particular.
We detail the key geopolitical events over the next year in the table below.
| Date | Location | Event |
|---|---|---|
| September | ||
| September 10-11 | EU | ECB Meeting |
| September 16-17 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| September 18 | UK | BOE Meeting |
| September 18-19 | Japan | BOJ Meeting |
| September 23-29 | United States | UNGA High-Level Week |
| October | ||
| October 13-18 | United States | IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings |
| October 15-16 | United States | G0 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors' Meeting |
| October 28-29 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| October 29-30 | EU | ECB Meeting |
| October 29-30 | Japan | BOJ Meeting |
| Fall TBC | China | Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit |
| November | ||
| November 6 | UK | BOE Meeting |
| November 10-21 | Brazil | UN Climate Change Conference (COP30) |
| November 11 | Ireland | Irish presidential election deadline |
| November 16 | Chile | Chilean general election |
| November 22-23 | South Africa | G20 Leaders' Summit |
| December | ||
| December 9-10 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| December 17-18 | EU | ECB Meeting |
| December 18 | UK | BOE Meeting |
| December 18-19 | Japan | BOJ Meeting |
Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, September 2025.
How it works
The quantitative components of our geopolitical risk dashboard incorporate two different measures of risk: the first based on the market attention to risk events, the second on the market movement related to these events.
Market attention
The BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) tracks the relative frequency of brokerage reports (via Refinitiv) and financial news stories (Dow Jones News) associated with specific geopolitical risks. We adjust for whether the sentiment in the text of articles is positive or negative, and then assign a score. This score reflects the level of market attention to each risk versus a 5-year history. We assign a heavier weight to brokerage reports than other media sources since we want to measure the market's attention to any particular risk, not the public’s.
Our updated methodology improves upon traditional “text mining” approaches that search articles for predetermined key words associated with each risk. Instead, we take a big data approach based on machine-learning. Huge advances in computing power now make it possible to use language models based on neural networks. These help us sift through vast data sets to estimate the relevance of every sentence in an article to the geopolitical risks we measure.
How does it work? First we “train” the language model with broad geopolitical content and articles representative of each individual risk we track. The pre-trained language model then focuses on two tasks when trawling though millions of brokerage reports and financial news stories:
- classifying the relevance of each sentence to the individual geopolitical risk to generate an attention score,
- classifying the sentiment of each sentence to produce a sentiment score
The attention and sentiment scores are aggregated to produce a composite geopolitical risk score. A zero score represents the average BGRI level over its history. A score of one means the BGRI level is one standard deviation above its historical average, implying above-average market attention to the risk. We weigh recent readings more heavily in calculating the average. The level of the BGRIs changes slowly over time even if market attention remains constant. This is to reflect the concept that a consistently high level of market attention eventually becomes “normal.”
Our language model helps provide more nuanced analysis of the relevance of a given article than traditional methods would allow. Example: Consider an analyst report with boilerplate language at the end listing a variety of different geopolitical risks. A simple keyword-based approach may suggest the article is more relevant than it really is; our new machine learning approach seeks to do a better job at adjusting for the context of the sentences – and determining their true relevance to the risk at hand.
Market movement
In the market movement measure, we use Market-Driven Scenarios (MDS) associated with each geopolitical risk event as a baseline for how market prices would respond to the realization of the risk event.
Our MDS framework forms the basis for our scenarios and estimates of their potential one-month impact on global assets. The first step is a precise definition of our scenarios – and well-defined catalysts (or escalation triggers) for their occurrence. We then use an econometric framework to translate the various scenario outcomes into plausible shocks to a global set of market indexes and risk factors.
The size of the shocks is calibrated by various techniques, including analysis of historical periods that resemble the risk scenario. Recent historical parallels are assigned greater weight. Some of the scenarios we envision do not have precedents – and many have only imperfect ones. This is why we integrate the views of BlackRock’s experts in geopolitical risk, portfolio management, and Risk and Quantitative Analysis into our framework. See the 2018 paper Market Driven Scenarios: An Approach for Plausible Scenario Construction for details. MDS are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving.
We then compile a market movement index for each risk.* This is composed of two parts:
- Similarity: This measures how “similar” the current market environment is to our expectation of what it would look like in the event the particular MDS was realized. We focus on trailing one-month returns of the relevant MDS assets.
- Magnitude: this measures the magnitude of the trailing one-month returns of the relevant MDS assets.
These two measures are combined to create an index that works as follows:
- A value of 1 would means that the market has reacted in an identical way as our MDS indicated. We call this “priced in.”
- A value of zero would indicate that the pattern of asset prices bears no resemblance at all to what the MDS for a particular risk would indicate.
- A value of -1 would indicate that assets are moving in the opposite direction to what the MDS would indicate. Markets are effectively betting against the risk.
*This material represents an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds, strategy or security in particular. The scenarios are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving.
Israel has altered significantly the security environment to its advantage over the last year, but the recent conflicts have yet to be resolved through lasting settlements – keeping risks of reescalation high. The U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in mid-June left Iran virtually defenseless against air and missile attacks without meaningfully disrupting the supply or transport of oil. Uncertainty over Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons remains. Iran now faces the possibility of comprehensive UN sanctions “snapping back” from mid-October if key nuclear safeguard milestones are not met. Israel is mobilizing for a major military assault in Gaza City – which would imply a long-term Israeli security presence in the strip. The likelihood of any meaningful ceasefire remains quite low. Israel continues efforts to broadly degrade Iranian proxies. In Lebanon, a tenuous ceasefire remains in place between Israel and Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has committed to disarming Hezbollah by year-end.
The U.S. and China have extended their tactical tariff truce as part of ongoing trade negotiations. President Trump continues to express interest in a summit meeting with President Xi this year. Confronting China remains at the core of nearly every major U.S. policy area and the U.S. national security team is committed to countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Military tensions have increased in the South China Sea and could worsen in the event of an accident or miscalculation. In August, a Chinese destroyer collided with a coast guard vessel near Scarborough Shoal during coercive maneuvers against a Philippine patrol. That prompted a U.S. naval response as the U.S. joined the largest-ever joint military drills between the Philippines and Australia the same month. Meanwhile, Taiwan announced it will boost its 2026 defense budget by nearly 23% – including, for the first time, coast guard funding – in response to mounting Chinese pressure. China continues multi-dimensional efforts to prepare for a Taiwan military contingency.
AI is at the center of U.S.-China strategic competition, with its enabling physical infrastructure increasingly treated as a national security asset. The U.S. administration is seeking to turbocharge AI development and the global diffusion of U.S. technologies. In July, it issued an AI Action Plan outlining more than 90 federal policy actions to accelerate AI innovation, build AI infrastructure and expand the U.S. tech stack abroad. The administration also stated its intention to lift bans on certain advanced chip sales to China under novel revenue-sharing conditions and announced a 10% stake in a U.S. chipmaker. These steps mark a departure from the previous administration’s approach to AI export controls and underscore the debate over AI’s commercial and national security imperatives.
Mounting geopolitical competition is fueling a surge in cyber attacks that are growing in scope, scale and sophistication. Around the world, new AI technology is enabling state and non-state actors to identify vulnerable targets, craft convincing scams and generate malicious code at unprecedented speed. Since ChatGPT’s launch in late 2022, phishing attacks have increased more than forty-fold, and FBI and IMF data suggest global cybercrime costs could exceed $23 trillion annually by 2027, more than the annual GDP of China. A proliferation of new AI models has also raised concerns over their vulnerability to hacking and manipulation, prompting alarm in national security circles. State-backed hacking remains a significant risk, increasingly focused on political espionage, infecting critical infrastructure with malware and large-scale theft of intellectual property.
The threat of terrorism against U.S. interests remains at an extraordinarily high level. Al-Qaida and the Islamic State still show persistent motivation to conduct or inspire attacks abroad, even after recent U.S. counterterrorism raids targeting senior ISIS leaders in Syria. We see risks stemming from sustained instability in the Middle East, particularly following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and in West Africa, where jihadist groups are steadily expanding their geographic reach. Closer to the U.S., the U.S. administration has increased its focus on Latin American drug cartels it has designated as terrorist organizations. In September, the U.S. conducted a military strike on a Venezuelan vessel alleged to be carrying cartel members after previously deploying naval forces off Venezuela’s coast and escalating its rhetoric against the Nicolás Maduro regime. The U.S. has also warned its citizens at home and abroad of a heightened risk of violence stemming from the Iran-Israel conflict in June.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the largest, most dangerous military conflict in Europe since World War Two. Rolling talks between Russian, Ukrainian, U.S. and European officials over the summer culminated in a meeting between U.S. President Trump and Russian President Putin in Alaska and a separate meeting days later between President Trump, President Zelensky and European leaders in Washington. These talks failed to produce a peace deal, temporary ceasefire or direct follow-on meeting between presidents Putin and Zelensky, which now seems unlikely. We think a definitive deal to end the war will be hard to reach given Russia’s maximalist goals in Ukraine, including territorial concessions, as well as Moscow’s dismissal of Western proposals for security guarantees. In the meantime, a war of attrition continues. The conflict has escalated. Russia’s summer offensive has made gains in the Donbas but has not achieved a strategic breakthrough, while Ukraine faces large-scale Russian drone and missile attacks against urban areas and energy infrastructure. Russia continues to test European resolve, including through ongoing grey zone operations and threats against greater European involvement inside Ukraine.
As global trade tensions escalate (see our Global trade protectionism risk), the impact on emerging market economies varies depending on their underlying economic structures and trade arrangements with the U.S. Several Southeast Asian countries secured near-uniform tariff rates of around 19-20%, largely preserving their relative competitiveness, though uncertainties remain around implementation, exemptions and higher rates on transshipped Chinese goods. Latin America appears better positioned, receiving lower tariff rates (except Brazil) and a separate 90-day tariff extension for Mexico in August. Amid ongoing trade uncertainty, many emerging markets are hedging with a multi-aligned approach, pursuing new trade deals, defense pacts and diplomatic initiatives with China and each other. India is a prime example, intensifying outreach to both Russia and China after a breakdown in U.S. trade talks and the imposition of additional tariffs.
North Korea has taken a series of escalatory actions that heighten risks in and beyond the Asia Pacific, including renouncing peaceful reunification with South Korea, accelerating its nuclear weapons program and deploying troops and munitions to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. U.S. President Trump has reiterated his desire to reengage North Korean leader Kim Jong Un through personal diplomacy, raising the prospect of renewed talks during his late-August summit with newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung. President Lee has likewise signaled interest in easing tensions with Pyongyang as part of a broader push for balance in South Korea’s foreign relations. North Korea has so far dismissed these overtures. Compared with President Trump’s first term, Pyongyang is emboldened by its stronger relationships with Russia and China as well as its own military advances. As a result, it may be less inclined to see better relations with the U.S. as a priority.
We’ve seen a reset of the U.S.-Europe relationship since the start of the second Trump administration. European governments, focused on pursuing "strategic autonomy,” have announced ambitious defense spending and economic reform agendas. But doubts are mounting over whether Europe can deliver on and sustain these pledges. In Germany, fiscal brake reform and large-scale commitments on defense and infrastructure risk colliding with bureaucratic and industrial bottlenecks. At the EU level, the new “Readiness 2030” initiative pledges up to €800 billion in joint defense funding but faces potentially uneven participation and capacity constraints. Meanwhile, the EU-U.S. trade deal struck in July secured lower tariffs than initially feared but comes against the backdrop of a new era of global trade disputes that could impact the continent’s growth and reform agenda. These shifts have boosted European unity in the short term, but we see some risks to longer-term cohesion. Recent elections have underscored the resilience and appeal of populist movements, while France remains in a period of structural political instability that is likely to extend until and potentially through scheduled elections in 2027.