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Mega forces: An investment opportunity
Mega forces are big, structural changes that affect investing now - and far in the future. This creates major opportunities - and risks - for investors.
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The global BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) aims to capture overall market attention to geopolitical risks, as the line chart shows. The indicator is a simple average of our top-10 risks.
We see the geopolitical environment shaped by a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy, as Washington pursues a more transactional approach that is accelerating geopolitical fragmentation and exposing fractures within the Western alliance. Escalation in the Middle East and rising tensions across the Western Hemisphere underscore how 2025–2026 may mark the start of a new geopolitical era
Sources: BlackRock Investment Institute. Views and data as of March 2026. Notes: The “risks” column lists the 10 key geopolitical risks that we track. The “description” column defines each risk. “Attention score” reflects the BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) for each risk. The BGRI measures the degree of the market’s attention to each risk, as reflected in brokerage reports and financial media. See the "how it works" section on p.7 for details. The table is sorted by the “Likelihood” column which represents our fundamental assessment, based on BlackRock’s subject matter experts, of the probability that each risk will be realized – either low, medium or high – in the near term. The “our view” column represents BlackRock’s most recent view on developments related to each risk. This is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds or security in particular. Individual portfolio managers for BlackRock may have opinions and/or make investment decisions that may, in certain respects, not be consistent with the information contained herein.
We have developed a market movement score for each risk that measures the degree to which asset prices have moved similarly to our risk scenarios, integrating insights from our Risk & Quantitative Analysis (RQA) team and their Market-Driven Scenario (MDS) shocks. We do this by estimating how “similar” the current market environment is to our expectation of what it would look like in the event the particular MDS was realized, also taking into account the magnitude of market moves. The far right of the horizontal axis indicates that the similarity between asset movements and what our MDS assumed is greatest; the middle of the axis means asset prices have shown little relationship to the MDS, and the far left indicates markets have behaved in the opposite way that our MDS anticipated.
Risk map
BlackRock Geopolitical market attention, market movement and likelihood
How to gauge the potential market impact of each of our top-10 risks? We have identified three key “scenario variables” for each – or assets that we believe would be most sensitive to a realization of that risk. The chart below shows the direction of our assumed price impact.
| Risk | Asset | Direction of assumed price impact | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Middle East regional war | Brent crude oil | ||
| VIX | |||
| U.S. high yield credit | |||
| Global technology decoupling | Chinese yuan | ||
| Chinese semiconductors | |||
| U.S. semiconductors and electrical equipment | |||
| Major cyber attack(s) | U.S. high yield utilities | ||
| U.S. dollar | |||
| U.S. utilities sector | |||
| Major terror attack(s) | Germany 10-year government bond | ||
| Japanese yen | |||
| Europe airlines sector | |||
| Global trade protectionism | U.S. specialty retail & distribution | ||
| U.S. consumer durables & apparel | |||
| U.S. two-year Treasury | |||
| U.S.-China strategic competition | Taiwanese dollar | ||
| Taiwanese equities | |||
| China high yield | |||
| Russia-NATO conflict | Russian equities | ||
| Russian ruble | |||
| Brent crude oil | |||
| Transatlantic reordering | |||
| To be updated | To be updated | ||
| Western Hemisphere tensions | Mexican peso | ||
| Gold | |||
| South American government bonds | |||
| North Korea conflict | Japanese yen | ||
| Korean won | |||
| Korean equities |
Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, with data from BlackRock’s Aladdin Portfolio Risk Tools application, March 2026. Notes: The table depicts the three assets that we see as key variables for each of our top-10 geopolitical risks – as well as the direction of the assumed shocks for each in the event of the risk materializing. The up arrow indicates a rise in prices (corresponding to a decline in yields for bonds); the down arrow indicates a fall in prices. Our analysis is based on similar historical events and current market conditions such as volatility and cross-asset correlations. See the “implied stress testing framework” section of the 2018 paper Market-Driven Scenarios: An Approach for Plausible Scenario Construction for details. For illustrative purposes only. The scenarios are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving. This material represents an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds, strategy or security in particular.
We detail the key geopolitical events over the next year in the table below.
| Date | Location | Event |
|---|---|---|
| January 2026 | ||
| Jan 19–23 | Switzerland | World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos) |
| Jan 22–23 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| Jan 27–28 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| February 2026 | ||
| Feb (TBC) | Bangladesh | General elections |
| Feb 4–5 | Euro area | ECB Governing Council monetary policy meeting (Frankfurt) |
| Feb 5 | United Kingdom | BOE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting |
| Feb 13–15 | Germany | Munich Security Conference (Munich) |
| March 2026 | ||
| Mar 17–18 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Mar 18–19 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting (Frankfurt) |
| Mar 18–19 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| Mar 19 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| April 2026 | ||
| April 2026 | U.S.-China | Potential China visit by President Trump |
| Apr 12 | Peru | Presidential & Congressional General Election |
| Apr 13–18 | United States | IMF & World Bank Group Spring Meetings (Washington, DC) |
| Mid-April (TBC) | United States | G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (on margins of Spring Meetings, dates TBC) |
| Apr 27–28 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| Apr 28–29 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Apr 29–30 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting (Frankfurt) |
| Apr 30 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| May 2026 | ||
| Late May / early June (TBC) | Singapore | Shangri-La Dialogue Asia Security Summit (dates TBC) |
| May / June (TBC) | France | OECD Ministerial Council Meeting (Paris, dates TBC) |
| May 31 | Colombia | Presidential Election |
| June 2026 | ||
| June / July TBC | U.S.-China | Potential U.S. trip by President Xi |
| Jun 10–11 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting |
| Jun 14–16 | France | G7 Leaders’ Summit (Évian-les-Bains) |
| Jun 15–16 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| Jun 16–17 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Jun 18 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| July 2026 | ||
| Jul 7–8 | Türkiye | NATO Leaders’ Summit (Ankara) |
| July (TBC) | India | 18th BRICS Leaders’ Summit (India chair; host city/dates TBC) |
| Jul 22–23 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting |
| Jul 28–29 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Jul 30 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| Jul 30–31 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| August 2026 | ||
| Early Aug (TBC) | G20 | Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (standalone FMCBG) |
| Late Aug (dates TBC) | United States | Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium (Jackson Hole, Wyoming) |
| September 2026 | ||
| Sep 8 | United States | Opening of 81st Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 81), New York |
| Sep 9–10 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting (hosted by Deutsche Bundesbank) |
| Sep 15–16 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Sep 17 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| Sep 17–18 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
| Sep 22–29 (TBC) | United States | UNGA 81 High-Level Week / General Debate (New York) |
| October 2026 | ||
| Oct 4 | Brazil | First round of Brazilian general elections (presidential, congressional, gubernatorial) |
| Oct 12–18 | Thailand | IMF & World Bank Group Annual Meetings (Bangkok) |
| Mid-October (TBC) | Thailand | G20 Finance Ministers & Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (on margins of Annual Meetings, dates TBC) |
| Oct 25 | Brazil | Possible second-round presidential vote (if needed) |
| Oct 27–28 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Oct 28–29 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting |
| November 2026 | ||
| Nov 3 | United States | U.S. midterm elections (Congressional and state-level races) |
| Nov 5 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| Nov 9–20 | Türkiye | UN Climate Change Conference (COP31), Antalya |
| November (TBC) | China | APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Shenzhen |
| December 2026 | ||
| Dec 8–9 | United States | FOMC Meeting |
| Dec 14–15 | United States | G20 Leaders’ Summit (U.S. G20 presidency year), Doral, Florida |
| Dec 16–17 | Euro area | ECB monetary policy meeting |
| Dec 17 | United Kingdom | BOE MPC meeting |
| Dec 17–18 | Japan | BOJ Monetary Policy Meeting |
Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, March 2026.
The quantitative components of our geopolitical risk dashboard incorporate two different measures of risk: the first based on the market attention to risk events, the second on the market movement related to these events.
The BlackRock Geopolitical Risk Indicator (BGRI) tracks the relative frequency of brokerage reports (via Refinitiv) and financial news stories (Dow Jones News) associated with specific geopolitical risks. We adjust for whether the sentiment in the text of articles is positive or negative, and then assign a score. This score reflects the level of market attention to each risk versus a 5-year history. We assign a heavier weight to brokerage reports than other media sources since we want to measure the market's attention to any particular risk, not the public’s.
Our updated methodology improves upon traditional “text mining” approaches that search articles for predetermined key words associated with each risk. Instead, we take a big data approach based on machine-learning. Huge advances in computing power now make it possible to use language models based on neural networks. These help us sift through vast data sets to estimate the relevance of every sentence in an article to the geopolitical risks we measure.
How does it work? First we “train” the language model with broad geopolitical content and articles representative of each individual risk we track. The pre-trained language model then focuses on two tasks when trawling though millions of brokerage reports and financial news stories:
The attention and sentiment scores are aggregated to produce a composite geopolitical risk score. A zero score represents the average BGRI level over its history. A score of one means the BGRI level is one standard deviation above its historical average, implying above-average market attention to the risk. We weigh recent readings more heavily in calculating the average. The level of the BGRIs changes slowly over time even if market attention remains constant. This is to reflect the concept that a consistently high level of market attention eventually becomes “normal.”
Our language model helps provide more nuanced analysis of the relevance of a given article than traditional methods would allow. Example: Consider an analyst report with boilerplate language at the end listing a variety of different geopolitical risks. A simple keyword-based approach may suggest the article is more relevant than it really is; our new machine learning approach seeks to do a better job at adjusting for the context of the sentences – and determining their true relevance to the risk at hand.
In the market movement measure, we use Market-Driven Scenarios (MDS) associated with each geopolitical risk event as a baseline for how market prices would respond to the realization of the risk event.
Our MDS framework forms the basis for our scenarios and estimates of their potential one-month impact on global assets. The first step is a precise definition of our scenarios – and well-defined catalysts (or escalation triggers) for their occurrence. We then use an econometric framework to translate the various scenario outcomes into plausible shocks to a global set of market indexes and risk factors.
The size of the shocks is calibrated by various techniques, including analysis of historical periods that resemble the risk scenario. Recent historical parallels are assigned greater weight. Some of the scenarios we envision do not have precedents – and many have only imperfect ones. This is why we integrate the views of BlackRock’s experts in geopolitical risk, portfolio management, and Risk and Quantitative Analysis into our framework. See the 2018 paper Market Driven Scenarios: An Approach for Plausible Scenario Construction for details. MDS are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving.
We then compile a market movement index for each risk.* This is composed of two parts:
These two measures are combined to create an index that works as follows:
*This material represents an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding any funds, strategy or security in particular. The scenarios are for illustrative purposes only and do not reflect all possible outcomes as geopolitical risks are ever-evolving.

On February 28 the U.S. and Israel launched a large-scale combat and intelligence operation targeting Iran’s leadership and military and security apparatus, resulting in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader and ongoing regional war. The U.S.’ articulated goals for the operation, which it dubs “Epic Fury,” include degrading Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure, internal security apparatus and Navy and destroying its nuclear program. Israel is pursuing a more maximalist regime change strategy. Iran has retaliated with strikes on Israel, U.S. military and civilian assets in the region and targets across the Gulf states, including regional energy infrastructure, as it seeks to exact cost and preserve its regime. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global energy, has ground to a near-halt amid Iranian threats to close it, with outsized consequences for Europe and Asia. Hezbollah has joined the fight by launching rockets into Israel, triggering Israeli retaliatory airstrikes across Lebanon. Key uncertainties include the duration of the conflict, which will be constrained by offensive and defensive stockpile limitations on both sides, and what leadership takes shape in Iran. Separately, a second phase of the U.S.-brokered peace plan to end the war between Israel and Hamas is now underway in Gaza. We think a lasting settlement will be difficult to achieve given the uneven implementation of phase one commitments and ongoing Israeli security operations in the territory.
U.S. and China accelerates in scale and scope.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly a national security issue and a political issue. It is at the center of U.S.-China strategic competition, with both countries believing it will deliver insurmountable economic and military advantage to the country leading the AI race. Data centers and other enabling infrastructure are now squarely in the frame of national security given their increased scale, visibility and economic importance. Governments and technology companies will need to more seriously consider physical risks alongside cyber risks as a result. As global fragmentation accelerates, even among traditional allies, tech sovereignty concerns will likely intensify. This will prompt questions about over-relying on any single country’s technology stack and drive more demand for increased data integrity and control. At the same time, tech companies and policymakers are grappling with societal and safety concerns around AI – from labor disruption to energy prices, privacy concerns and abuse by authoritarian systems.
Mounting geopolitical competition is fueling a surge in cyber attacks that are growing in scope, scale and sophistication. Advances in generative and agentic AI now empower even unsophisticated threat actors, including criminals, to identify vulnerable targets, craft convincing scams and generate malicious code – at unprecedented speed and with increasing autonomy. Beyond phishing, AI is being used to generate adaptive malware, exploit identity credentials and probe AI systems themselves for weaknesses. Recent disclosures by leading AI developers that state‑linked actors have sought to replicate frontier models through illicit training on Western platforms underscore how AI systems themselves are becoming targets in geopolitical competition. State-backed hacking remains a significant and expanding risk, focused on political espionage, infecting critical infrastructure with malware and large-scale theft of intellectual property. Iran remains a capable state actor in this space. We are watching for accelerated Iranian cyber operations targeting the West in light of the U.S. and Israeli operation and expanded regional war.
The threat of terrorism against U.S. interests remains high. Extremist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda continue to demonstrate intent to attack U.S. interests, exploiting instability in the Sahel, East Africa, and Middle East. In Syria, thousands of ISIS-linked detainees and family members escaped from the Al-Hawl camp in January, while new UN estimates suggest Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have 50 times more recruits than they had around 9/11. Iran retains significant cyber and global terrorism capabilities that could be deployed in response to the death of the its Supreme Leader and an ongoing existential threat to the regime’s survival. Western intelligence agencies are on high alert.
We introduce a Western Hemisphere tensions risk to reflect a decisive reorientation of U.S. security priorities towards the region following the January U.S. operation to capture Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and seize control of Venezuela's oil market, along with the largest military buildup in the Caribbean since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Several reinforcing dynamics drive this shift, including a domestic policy confluence of immigration and counternarcotics; resource nationalism; and a strategic effort to reassert U.S. dominance in the hemisphere, consistent with a revived interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. We think the U.S. will employ coercive economic, diplomatic, law enforcement and military levers to compel compliance from countries in the hemisphere and put pressure on adversary regimes. Cuba is currently in focus as a halt of Venezuelan oil imports and U.S. pressure against other oil providers have pushed Cuba’s economy – and regime – to its weakest point since the early 1990s.
On February 20, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated tariffs imposed under a 1977 emergency powers statute that constituted the Trump administration’s universal baseline and country-specific “reciprocal” tariffs, as well as fentanyl-linked tariffs on China, Canada and Mexico. These measures were central to President Trump’s tariff agenda and underpinned bilateral trade agreements that may now face legal uncertainty or pressure to reopen negotiations. Within days of the ruling, the Administration implemented an initial 10% across-the-board tariff level under separate Section 122 authority – reinforcing our view that it will move quickly to reconstitute much of its tariff program through alternative authorities. We expect new Section 301 investigations to follow, with rolling negotiations, agreements and disputes representing the new normal in U.S. trade policy. Global trade flows are rewiring, not reversing. Even with growing protectionism, global trade exceeded a record $35 trillion last year. Countries hedging away from the U.S. are increasingly diversifying trade ties, including through the EU-Mercosur and the EU-India agreements announced in January. China's record $1.2 trillion trade surplus for 2025 poses a significant overcapacity challenge for consumption economies in Europe and Southeast Asia.
The Trump administration remains determined to maintain a commercially focused détente with China following the October meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in South Korea and a follow-up call in early February. The trade truce buys time for each side to focus on domestic concerns and manage strategic vulnerabilities in areas like critical minerals and advanced semiconductor supply chains. For now, the détente is holding – but it is narrow, fragile and subject to disruption across a range of issues, particularly defense and security. We expect this period of relative stability to persist this year, with a series of potential leader-level engagements beginning with Trump’s scheduled visit to Beijing in late March. At the same time, structural competition with China remains at the core of nearly every major U.S. policy, across trade, tech, cyber, defense and energy. In the military sphere, the U.S. remains committed to countering China in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan remains a potential flashpoint: In December, the U.S. announced a record $11 billion arms package for Taiwan, and China conducted some of the most expansive military maneuvers near the island to date amid rising regional frictions.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the largest and most dangerous military conflict in Europe since World War Two. Recent diplomacy has led to the first talks between all three of Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ukrainian officials have said that Russia would accept U.S.-backed security guarantees for Ukraine, although negotiations remain stalled and ongoing Russian escalations will still challenge a durable settlement, in our view. In the meantime, Ukraine faces large-scale Russian drone and missile attacks on urban areas and energy infrastructure, leaving citizens without power and heat over winter. Ukraine has responded with sustained strikes on Russian energy export facilities and military targets. Moscow keeps testing European resolve through ongoing grey-zone operations, to which governments have begun to implement a stronger response.
U.S.-Europe relations have undergone a complete reset since the start of the second Trump administration and are now under historic strain. A combination of economic and security flashpoints have deepened the fracture – including recent U.S. threats to seize Greenland by force. At the World Economic Forum, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney called for middle powers to unite around shared interests and to resist coercion from great powers, echoed by other European leaders. This is likely to accelerate ongoing trends towards diversification away from the U.S., seen in a slate of new free trade agreements, sweeping defense spending, fiscal reforms and a procession of Western leaders to Beijing. Europe's push for strategic autonomy is directionally feasible, but we think fully substituting its economic and security relationship with the U.S. is unlikely. Decision-making complexity at an EU level will further constrain those efforts. Hedging towards China as part of this strategy risks exposing domestic industries to Chinese industrial overcapacity and inviting a U.S. response. We expect these geopolitical changes to accelerate Europe’s reform agenda and unlock opportunities for investors, outlined in our November paper, "What's needed for Europe's Investment Renaissance?".
North Korea has taken a series of escalatory actions that heighten risks in and beyond the Indo-Pacific: renouncing peaceful reunification with South Korea, accelerating its nuclear weapons program and deploying troops and munitions to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Pyongyang has ramped up its missile program since the start of the year, launching multiple short-range ballistic missiles in January and testing advanced hypersonic weapons. Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung share a desire to ease tensions with Pyongyang and engage North Korea Leader Kim Jong-un through personal diplomacy. Yet compared with Trump’s first term, Pyongyang appears emboldened by its stronger ties with Russia and China, as well as its own military advances. North Korea may therefore be less inclined to pursue better relations with the U.S. At a regional level, a January summit between the leaders of South Korea and Japan led to commitments for deeper defense cooperation, evidenced by the resumption of joint naval search-and-rescue training after nine years.