



October 2025

Global Credit Quarterly: 4Q2025

Still climbing the
'wall of worry'

BlackRock

Authors



**Amanda Lynam,
CPA**
Head of Macro Credit
Research



Dominique Bly
Macro Credit Research
Strategist

Key takeaways

- **Macro:** While U.S. growth has moderated from the above-trend pace of 2021-2024, it is 'supportive enough' to sustain resilience in risk assets, in our view. This should translate into normalizing monetary policy from the Fed, not a deep easing cycle. We see scope for a convergence between U.S. and European growth. [Pages 3 – 14.](#)
- **Liquid credit:** We continue to see an opportunity cost in being too defensive and remain comfortable selectively moving down in credit quality, given solid corporate fundamentals. We prioritize income and carry over duration exposure, given our rates view. [Pages 15 – 25.](#)
- **Private credit:** The structural growth drivers behind this asset class remain in place, and episodic market volatility is likely to further expand the addressable market of borrowers seeking a private financing solution. Similar to liquid credit, the fundamental signals are encouraging, in aggregate, albeit with some visible dispersion. This underscores the importance of credit selection, underwriting and workout expertise. [Pages 26 – 35.](#)
- **Commercial real estate (CRE):** Pricing has stabilized across even the most challenged sectors, and investors appear to be embracing an environment of structurally higher interest rates. This should support further momentum in transaction volumes, as well as the refinancing of CRE loans (scheduled and recent extensions). [Pages 36 – 40.](#)
- **Risks to our view:** A sharp downturn in global growth and severe deterioration in corporate profit margins are the key downside risks. Upside risks include an above-trend pace of economic activity, bolstered by a combination of consumer spending and business investment.

Macro: two-sided risks

Monitoring corporate margins and looking for confirmation of an upward inflection in earnings

Resilient growth poised to persist, in our view


In our *3Q2025 Global Credit Outlook*, we highlighted the importance of monitoring *two-sided* macroeconomic risks, given the opportunity cost of being too defensive (and under-risked) in this environment. Heading into 4Q2025, our posture towards credit risk is still constructive, driven by a mix of ‘solid enough’ global growth, healthy corporate fundamentals, and favorable technical dynamics across a range of credit markets.

In the U.S., resilient consumer spending and capital investment have resulted in 1H2025 real GDP growth of 1.7% - not that far below potential and bolstered by an especially strong 2Q2025 reading. Moreover, years of above trend growth in 2021-2024 have strengthened corporates’ financial positions, and gains in housing and equity markets have also reinforced the balance sheets of some U.S. consumer cohorts. This, coupled with some support from recent fiscal legislation (which will become effective in early 2026), strengthens the case for resilient U.S. growth through 2026, in our view.

After a few years of sharp growth differentials across the U.S. and Europe (Exhibit 1), we see scope for more convergence as fiscal spending on defense and infrastructure eventually takes hold in Europe. That said, we acknowledge that this may be a longer-term development.

Exhibit 1: Increased scope for convergence in U.S. and European growth

Actual real GDP (annual, year-over-year) for the U.S. and Eurozone, from 1992 to 2024, and 1H2025, and Bloomberg composite forecasts for full-year 2025 – 2027



Source: Bloomberg, BlackRock. As of September 25, 2025. 1H2025 uses the average of 1Q2025 and 2Q2025 quarter-on-quarter figures. 2025 - 2027 estimates use the Bloomberg Composite of forecasters. **There is no guarantee any forecasts may come to pass.**

Likely past peak trade uncertainty

Two key views underpin our constructive view on risk assets. The first is the view that peak trade policy uncertainty is likely in the rear-view mirror, as illustrated by Exhibit 2. While we expect additional announcements on sector-specific tariffs, we view this as a catalyst for additional dispersion, as opposed to broad market disruption.


Second is our confidence in corporate management teams' ability to continue to navigate a dynamic policy environment. 2Q2025 earnings season was notable, in our view, as a wide range of management teams – across a variety of sectors – provided incremental clarity on the operational levers at their disposal to navigate and mitigate potential cost pressures.

For example, a range of retail and consumer-focused firms have highlighted a variety of internal efficiency initiatives to protect profitability. These include plans for a combination of: faster inventory turnover, changes to order timing, savings on shipping/logistic costs, vendor negotiations, sourcing diversification, price adjustments, shifts in product mix, divesting unprofitable business lines, productivity enhancements to SG&A (including using more digital tools), headcount reductions, using more automation in manufacturing, and supply chain organizational shifts. Some of these programs – which were originally planned to take place over time – are now being approached with more urgency and focus.

And while potential margin headwinds related to higher input costs are among the most prominent downside risks we are monitoring, we are also attuned to upside risks in this environment, such as deregulation and corporate tax incentives related to recently passed legislation.

Exhibit 2: Peak trade policy uncertainty has likely passed

Trade Policy Uncertainty Index




Source: Haver Analytics, BlackRock. Captures data through August 31, 2025 (most recent available as of September 25, 2025). The Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) Index is based on automated text searches of the electronic archives of seven newspapers: Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Guardian, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. The measure is calculated by counting the monthly frequency of articles discussing trade policy uncertainty (as a share of the total number of news articles) for each newspaper. The index is then normalized to a value of 100 for a one percent article share. Developed by Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo.

Companies' ability to adapt

Corporates' ability to adapt to a shifting policy backdrop is evident in the positive inflection of management teams' earnings guidance and analysts' earnings expectations since April 2025. For U.S.-listed companies, 39% reported a positive change to earnings guidance in August 2025 – the highest since June 2023 and extending the trend over the past few months (Exhibit 3). Similarly, the share of firms reporting a downward change to earnings guidance dropped to 20.5% in August – the lowest since mid-2021 (again, Exhibit 3). We expect a similar directional move once the September 2025 data are available. Higher frequency data shows a similar positive inflection in analysts' S&P 500 earnings estimates for the next 12 months (Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 3: Earnings guidance has inflected higher


Monthly earnings guidance revisions provided by U.S. corporates (as of each month end)



Source: Bloomberg Intelligence, BlackRock. Captures data through August 31, 2025 (most recent available as of September 27, 2025). Excludes neutral guidance revisions. Captures guidance for all companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange (as the primary and active exchange). **There is no guarantee any forecasts may come to pass.**

Exhibit 4: A similar trend is visible for the S&P 500

Net Revision Momentum: 12-month forward EPS, for the S&P 500




Source: Bloomberg Intelligence, BlackRock. Captures data through September 19, 2025 (most recent available as of September 27, 2025). **There is no guarantee any forecasts may come to pass.**

The margins-labor ‘feedback loop’

That said, there are residual risks to monitor. The most critical, in our view, is the ‘feedback loop’ between corporate margins, the labor market, consumer spending and overall economic activity. The U.S. labor market has been characterized as “low hire, low fire” by Chair Powell – a trend that is also visible in Exhibit 5. If corporate margins experience material, sustained pressure, we see a risk for the layoff rate to increase from its low level. And given the low demand for labor (evident in the weaker than expected non-farm payrolls data in July, which included downward revisions to prior months), it will likely take longer for the recently unemployed to find new work. A potential pull back in consumer spending would be a headwind to economic activity, given the consumer generates two-thirds of U.S. GDP. For now, however, corporate margins are demonstrating resilience – especially in USD IG (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 5: The “low hire, low fire” labor market


U.S. Layoffs & Discharge Rate (%), the U.S. Quits Rate (%), and the U.S. Hires Rate (%), all seasonally adjusted



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bloomberg, BlackRock. Captures data through July 31, 2025 (most recent as of September 29, 2025). The Layoffs & Discharge Rate tracks involuntary job separations initiated by the employer; the Quits Rate tracks voluntary job separations initiated by the employee; the Hires Rate tracks additions to the payroll.

Exhibit 6: Margins may absorb some portion of higher input costs

Trailing 12-month adjusted EBITDA margins for the median issuer in the Bloomberg USD IG and HY Corporate indices



Source: Bloomberg Intelligence, BlackRock. Captures data through 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 29, 2025). Indexes are unmanaged and are used for illustrative purposes only. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Monetary policy has already normalized

Over the past several months, a range of developed market central banks have reduced the level of restriction embedded in their monetary policy rates (Exhibit 7). We see limited scope for additional, deep rate cuts across many of these regions. This means that floating-rate corporate borrowers and consumers will need to navigate a structurally higher cost of financing relative to the period between the global financial crisis and the pandemic (again, Exhibit 7). It also means, however, that the income opportunity captured by investors is likely to remain attractive by historical standards.


The European Central Bank (ECB) has delivered 200bp of rate cuts, and we expect the Governing Council will be on hold for the foreseeable future, now that inflation is closer to target (more on page 13) and risks to growth are more balanced. This was echoed by President Lagarde at the September 11th press conference, when she offered that policy was in “a good place,” albeit not on a predetermined path.

We expect the Bank of England (BoE) will remain on hold through 4Q2025. The Monetary Policy Committee has cited a “gradual and careful” approach to reducing the level of restriction in monetary policy, given the upside risks to inflation (and potential for second round effects resulting in higher wages).

In the U.S., the Federal Reserve (Fed) resumed its rate cutting cycle in September 2025, adding to the 100bp of rate cuts delivered in 2H2024. The 25bp cut in September was framed as a “risk management” cut, designed to push monetary policy in the direction of neutral, given the recent weakening in the labor market data. We continue to expect normalizing monetary policy, not a deep easing cycle into accommodative territory.

Exhibit 7: Monetary policy moves toward neutral

Monetary policy rates for the European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, and Bank of England



Source: BlackRock, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bloomberg. As of September 23, 2025.

Tension in the Fed's dual mandate

The actions taken by the Federal Reserve have a significant impact on global financial markets, given the sheer size of the U.S. economy (the world's largest, at \$30 trillion) as well as the 'ripple effects' from central bank actions on global interest rate and foreign exchange markets.

Over the past few months, Fed officials have been increasingly vocal regarding the inherent tension in their dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. This view was once again echoed by Chair Powell at the September FOMC, when he stated "there are no risk-free paths" for monetary policy, given the tension between sticky inflation and softening labor demand.


As shown by Exhibit 8, core PCE inflation has been above the Fed's 2% target since early 2021. Meanwhile, demand for labor has softened, and job creation is running below the so-called "breakeven rate" required to keep the unemployment rate constant.

For now, it appears that the FOMC is poised to continue to 'look through' elevated inflation and place more emphasis on the growth/labor market side of its mandate. For example, the Fed's most recent Summary of Economic Projections shows the median Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participant expecting inflation to return to 2% in 2028.

Additionally, in public remarks in late September 2025, Chair Powell revisited the framing he first provided in his speech at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, when he noted that "a reasonable base case" (vis-à-vis tariffs) is that the effects will be "relatively short lived — a one-time shift in the price level," while adding that "one-time does not mean all at once."

Exhibit 8: We expect the Fed will continue to 'look through' elevated inflation, in the near term

U-3 U.S. unemployment rate (%) seasonally adjusted, and year-over-year U.S. Core PCE inflation (%) seasonally adjusted, RHS



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, BlackRock. Captures data through August 31, 2025 (most recent available as of September 30, 2025).


The *normalizing vs. easing* debate

While many investors are focused on the *timing* of any additional rate cuts from the Fed, we place more emphasis on the *drivers and depth* of the rate cutting cycle. In our view, rate cuts in response to easing inflation and actions done to ‘get ahead’ of additional material labor market weakness are likely to be supportive of risk asset valuations. By contrast, rate cuts in response to a visible (and potentially non-linear) deterioration in the labor market would likely be accompanied by increased risk premia in credit and equity markets – leaving such an action less supportive, in our view, for risk asset valuations.

Our base case calls for *normalizing* monetary policy, not a deep easing cycle into *accommodative* territory. But a factor at the heart of this debate is the so-called “neutral” rate of interest, which neither stimulates nor restricts the economy. A wide range of Fed officials have acknowledged the lack of clarity in pinpointing an exact level of neutral (Chair Powell has said “we know it by its works”). The median FOMC participant forecasts a longer-term Fed Funds rate of 3.0%. But market-based measures imply a higher neutral rate closer to 3.85% (Exhibit 9). Additionally, Exhibit 10 highlights how financial conditions have eased since early April 2025 – suggesting the economy (at least in aggregate) is not experiencing widespread restraint from the current level of monetary policy.

Exhibit 9: We see scope for a higher “neutral” rate


1y1y Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) forwards, as a proxy for the terminal rate of this cycle, and 5y5y OIS as a proxy for the long-term neutral rate



Source: Bloomberg, BlackRock. As of September 24, 2025.

Exhibit 10: Financial conditions, in aggregate, are not tight

Goldman Sachs U.S. Financial Conditions Index



Source: BlackRock, Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. As of September 29, 2025.


Consumer spending presses ahead

One of the most important factors underpinning the resilience of U.S. economic activity has been strength in aggregate consumer spending, which represents two-thirds of U.S. GDP. Data from the Federal Reserve shows that household net worth has increased from \$148 trillion in 1Q2023 to \$176 trillion as of 2Q2025, owing to gains in housing and investment markets. This ongoing strength was evident in September's U.S. retail sales data as well as anecdotal commentary from consumer-focused firms during the past few months, which highlighted a resilient backdrop in aggregate, albeit with some bifurcation in consumer spending patterns under the surface. For example, cost-conscious and value-seeking behavior was cited more often from younger and lower-income consumers.

Data from the New York Fed shows an increase in delinquent U.S. consumer debt balances, back to pre-pandemic levels (Exhibit 11). But as Exhibit 12 illustrates, the various types of consumer credit are experiencing vastly different backdrops, driven by collateral types and corresponding value fluctuations, fixed vs. floating interest rate exposure, and consumer focus.

Exhibit 11: Delinquent debt balances are back to pre-pandemic levels


Percentage of total debt balances for U.S. consumers, by delinquent status



Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 30, 2025).

Exhibit 12: Student loan delinquencies inflected higher, following the late 2024 grace period expiration

Percent of balance 90+ days delinquent, by loan type



Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 30, 2025). The Other category includes Consumer Finance (sales financing, personal loans) and Retail (clothing, grocery, department stores, home furnishings, gas etc.) loans.


Bifurcation is evident

Beyond consumer credit *types*, bifurcation among income and age cohorts is also evident, as shown in Exhibits 13 and 14. For example, only 44% of consumers in the lowest income quintile are homeowners, compared to 87% in the highest income cohort. And student loans represent 28% of aggregate debt balances for the 18- to 29-year-old cohort of U.S. consumers, while mortgages represent a much greater share for older consumers. This helps explain, in our view, why delinquency rates for the younger cohort have outpaced older age groups in recent quarters, as we recently noted. It also underscores the trend of bifurcation and dispersion we have been highlighting – which has direct implications for credit investors given the different customer end markets served by various sectors (and firms).

While bifurcation is not a new concept, we believe it matters more in the current market, given the backdrop of elevated interest rates and considering the significant asset appreciation in home prices and equity markets over the past few years. For example, consumers in a *net borrower* position are encountering higher debt service costs while not participating in gains from home ownership and stock market investments (as those in a *net asset owner* position have).

Exhibit 13: Home ownership – and spending contributions – vary across income cohorts


U.S. annual aggregate expenditures by consumer income quintile, and the share of consumers in each that are homeowners (RHS)



Source: BlackRock, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (September 2024, most recent available).

Exhibit 14: Student loans represent 28% of younger consumers' total debt balances

Share of debt balances by type and age



Source: New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 30, 2025).


Europe: a mix of tailwinds to monitor

In late August, the U.S. and E.U. announced a trade framework, another step in the direction of reducing uncertainty related to trade policy. This is notable, given the established link between trade policy uncertainty and the potential for adverse economic developments (as discussed by the ECB in May). We view this – especially when considered alongside less restrictive borrowing costs, following 200bp of ECB rate cuts since mid-2024 – as supportive for Europe’s growth prospects over the coming quarters. Recent survey indicators have also pointed to underlying positive momentum in manufacturing and services, as President Lagarde noted in September. Over the longer-term, we also see potential for investment to be supported by the recent fiscal plans on infrastructure and defense spending.

Economic activity for the Euro Area grew 0.7% in 1H2025, and the ECB expects 1.0% growth in 2026 and 1.3% in 2027. Inflation is now close to the Governing Council’s 2% medium-term target (Exhibit 15), and forward-looking indicators such as the ECB’s wage tracker suggest that compensation per employee will moderate further (vs. the 3.9% level in 2Q2025). Appreciation in the Euro, to the extent it persists, may also help curb goods inflation in the region (Exhibit 16).

Exhibit 15: Inflation is close to the ECB’s target


Year-over-year inflation (not seasonally adjusted) for the Euro Area, by category



Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg, European Central Bank, BlackRock. Captures inflation data through August 31, 2025 (most recent available as of September 30, 2025).

Exhibit 16: The Euro has strengthened

EURUSD and EURJPY spot exchange rates



Source: Bloomberg, BlackRock. As of September 26, 2025.

Asia: solid exports, weak domestic demand

One of the most notable macroeconomic developments from the Asia Pacific region over the past few months has been the relative resilience of export activity, despite tariff-related volatility. A September 21st analysis by Goldman Sachs Research found that Asia's exports increased 7% in U.S. dollar terms through August 2025 (and 8% in real terms, through July), compared to the same period last year.

Technology exports – especially from Taiwan – led the strength. We expect this pattern to persist, driven by the ongoing demands related to the build-out of artificial intelligence capabilities and related infrastructure.

Under the surface, we also see evidence of a regional mix shift. As shown in Exhibit 17, China's exports to the U.S. have declined in recent months, while its exports to Europe have increased. This has implications across regions. For example, ECB economists have estimated that additional Chinese exports could lower headline HICP inflation by 0.15 percentage points in 2026, with smaller effects persisting in 2027.

Beyond the potential for export and supply chain fluctuations, weak domestic consumption in Asia is also a focus – especially in China. Using Bloomberg consensus forecasts, growth for the Asia Pacific region is expected to remain stagnant from 2025 through 2027, at approximately 3.8% in real terms. This marks a deceleration from the 2023-2024 pace of 4.4-4.5%.

That said, most central banks in the region (with the exception of Japan) have room to ease interest rates, as needed.

Exhibit 17: Evidence of a 'mix shift' in exports

China exports to the U.S. and E.U., in \$ billions (not seasonally adjusted)



Source: China Customs General Administration, Bloomberg, BlackRock. Captures data through August 31, 2025 (most recent as of September 26, 2025).

Liquid credit: focus on yield

We are still comfortable *selectively* moving down in credit quality

The spread vs. yield ‘tug of war’ persists

One of the themes which has remained firmly in place over the past several quarters has been the resilience of credit spreads. Episodes of widening around periods of market volatility have been short lived, and spreads across most rating cohorts continue to hover at the tight end of the post-global financial crisis range, in the USD and EUR markets.

A range of factors have contributed, including ‘good enough’ economic activity (as mentioned earlier), solid corporate fundamentals, and supply and demand technical tailwinds (such as limited net issuance and robust demand from yield-based investors, as all-in yields are still attractive by historical standards; Exhibit 19). Many of these factors are expected to remain in place for 4Q2025, as we outline in the following slides.

Exhibit 18: Spreads have remained tight...

Percentile rank of daily index-level corporate bond option-adjusted spreads, since January 1, 2010





Exhibit 19: ...supported by the yield backdrop

Percentile rank of daily index-level corporate bond yield-to-worst levels, since January 1, 2010



For both charts: Source: BlackRock, Bloomberg, ICE-BAML. As of September 26, 2025. **The figures shown relate to past performance. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of current or future results.** Index performance returns do not reflect any management fees, transaction costs, or expenses. Indices are unmanaged and one cannot invest directly in an index. We exclude USD AAA, EUR AAA, and EUR CCC due to their small size.


Selectively move down in credit quality

Since April 10th, we have been comfortable selectively moving down in credit quality, driven by a mix of macroeconomic, fundamental and technical factors. For investors constrained to the investment grade (IG) universe, this has meant a preference for BBB-rated credit over its higher rated peers (where we see more scope for balance sheet deterioration within the construct of an IG rating).

And for investors with a more flexible mandate, this has meant reaching into the high-end of high yield. As Exhibit 20 illustrates, net leverage for the BB and BBB cohorts is very similar. That said, the very thin financial cushions (and highly idiosyncratic nature) of the CCC-rated cohort require an intense focus on credit selection (Exhibits 20 and 21).

Exhibit 20: Leverage for BBBs and BBs is modest, and similar


Trimmed mean (excludes top / bottom 10%) leverage metrics, for the last twelve months ended 2Q2025. Captures issuers in the Bloomberg USD IG and HY Corporate indices.



Source: Bloomberg, BlackRock. Captures trailing 12-month metrics as of 2Q2025 (most recent available as of September 29, 2025).

Exhibit 21: Coverage varies significantly, however

Trimmed mean (excludes top / bottom 10%) interest coverage metrics, for the last twelve months ended 2Q2025. Captures issuers in the Bloomberg USD IG and HY Corporate indices.



Source: Bloomberg, BlackRock. Captures trailing 12-month metrics as of 2Q2025 (most recent available as of September 29, 2025).

Carry and income are the focus

As shown in Exhibits 22 and 23, the lower-rated portions of the corporate credit market have been resilient on a year-to-date basis – again underscoring why a ‘generic’ up-in-quality tilt may not be the best approach even when uncertainty is elevated and policy shifts are frequent. For investors allocating to fixed rate corporate credit, we recommend doing so for the yield and income opportunity – and not for a potential total return ‘boost’ from tighter spreads or lower interest rates. We see limited scope for spreads to tighten on an absolute basis from current levels but also see a high bar for a sustained sell-off (i.e., widening) in credit spreads.

Exhibit 22: The high-end of HY has been resilient vs. its higher-rated peer group

Year-to-date total returns (%) for various USD corporate credit indices





Exhibit 23: EUR HY has also outpaced EUR IG on a total return basis

Year-to-date total returns (%) for various EUR corporate credit indices



For both charts: Source: Bloomberg, Pitchbook LCD, BlackRock. As of September 26, 2025. **The figures shown relate to past performance. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of current or future results.** Index performance returns do not reflect any management fees, transaction costs or expenses. Indices are unmanaged and one cannot invest directly in an index.


Favorable demand technicals in HY

Exhibits 24 and 25 illustrate how supportive the technical backdrop has been for the USD and EUR HY bond markets. Using 'use of proceeds' data captured by Dealogic, we find that 69% of the year-to-date gross USD HY supply has been earmarked for debt repayment or refinancing. This is just below the post-financial crisis record of 72% set in 2024. Similarly, the share of gross EUR HY issuance earmarked for debt repayment or refinancing stands at 63%. This follows 2024, which was also a heavy year for refinancing activity, at 55%.

In both markets, back-to-back years of limited net new issuance have created a supportive technical backdrop. We expect HY management teams will remain prudent and proactive with their balance sheet management, as they have done since the pandemic. In some cases, this may mean opting to address upcoming maturities well in excess of the 12-month mark prior to maturity (when a debt becomes 'current').

Exhibit 24: Most recent issuance in the USD HY market has been refinancing related


USD HY gross issuance by tranche use of proceeds and the share related to refinancing (RHS)



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 is as of September 29, 2025.

Exhibit 25: The share of refinancing issuance in EUR HY reached a new local peak

EUR HY gross issuance by tranche use of proceeds and the share related to refinancing (RHS)



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 is as of September 26, 2025.


Loan technicals are also a tailwind

Similar to the USD and EUR HY bond markets, the technicals in the leveraged loan market have also been a tailwind – a pattern we expect to persist, largely owing to the strong levels of collateralized loan obligation (CLO) creation illustrated in Exhibits 26 and 27. While shifts in the so-called CLO ‘arbitrage’ may moderate the pace of CLO creation from here, we expect it will nonetheless remain a supportive factor for leveraged loans in the secondary market. For context, as of August 2025, there were 272 open CLO warehouses in the USD market – the highest on record, according to data compiled by Barclays Research and U.S. Bank.

That said, for corporate credit allocators choosing between the USD HY and leveraged loan markets, the more important relative value considerations relate to the yield opportunity and duration exposure, in our view. When isolating at the B rating level, index level data compiled by PitchBook LCD shows that leveraged loans offer a 132bp yield ‘pick up’ relative to HY bonds. While down from the peak of 273bp in September 2024 (just prior to the start of the Fed’s rate cutting cycle), it still compares favorably to the 82bp in early April 2025.

Exhibit 26: Demand for USD leveraged loans is elevated


USD leveraged loan market: measurable investor demand



Source: Pitchbook LCD, Morningstar Direct, BlackRock. Data through September 24, 2025 (most recent as of September 26, 2025). Fund flow data includes monthly reporters.

Exhibit 27: A similar trend in the EUR market

EUR leveraged loan market: rolling 3-month institutional market net supply vs. CLO issuance



Source: PitchBook LCD, Morningstar European Leveraged Loan Index. Data through June 30, 2025 (most recent as of September 26, 2025). Net supply is calculated as new issues tracked by the index minus repayments.


Defaults will likely remain contained

Looking ahead to 4Q2025 (and into 2026), we expect default activity to moderate, in aggregate, given the growth and monetary policy backdrops we outlined earlier. Within the USD leveraged finance universe, the gap between floating rate and fixed rate borrowers should also continue to narrow, as it has been over the past few months (Exhibit 28), as floating rate borrowers experience incremental relief with the Fed's most recent (and anticipated) rate cuts.

That said, some of the key default themes from the past several quarters are likely to remain in place. Most notable, in our view, is the elevated share of 'repeat defaulters' (Exhibit 29), which we believe is driven by 'incomplete' balance sheet relief for the most stressed credits. Firms attempting distressed exchanges instead of formal Chapter 11 filings may struggle to 'grow into' their debt capital structures.

Exhibit 28: The gap between loan and HY defaults should continue to narrow


Trailing 12-month, issuer-weighted default rates for the universe of USD HY bonds and USD leveraged loans tracked by Moody's



Source: BlackRock, Moody's. As of August 31, 2025 (most recent available as of September 28, 2025).

Exhibit 29: As distressed exchanges have become more common, so too have 'repeat defaulters'

Share of repeat defaulters in the USD credit market




Source: J.P. Morgan Research, as of September 2, 2025.

A focus on foreign demand for USD credit

Another closely watched development for corporate credit investors has been foreign investors' appetite for USD credit, as this cohort owns more than 25% of the USD corporate bond market (Exhibit 30). At the start of the year, many market participants were concerned about a possible moderation in "U.S. exceptionalism," and the potential for a reallocation of capital flows outside of the U.S. Those concerns are not visible in data from the U.S. Treasury, however. Since the start of the year, foreign investors' holdings of long-term USD corporate bonds increased 7%, while holdings of USD stocks increased 9%. And the most recent data from the U.S. Treasury shows that year-to-date foreign demand remains on pace to rival 2023 and 2024 levels (Exhibit 31).

Exhibit 30: More than 25% of USD corporate debt is held by foreign investors


Ownership distribution of the USD corporate bond market



Source: BlackRock, Haver Analytics, Federal Reserve Board. Captures data as of 2Q2025 (most recent available as of September 30, 2025).

Exhibit 31: The tailwind from foreign demand has moderated in 2025, but it hasn't disappeared

Net annual sales of USD corporate bonds to foreigners, by type



Source: U.S. Treasury, Haver Analytics, BlackRock. Captures annual data through year-end 2024 and July 31, 2025 (most recent as of September 28, 2025).


The M&A momentum is poised to extend

Beyond earnings guidance commentary from management teams, strategic M&A is also closely watched as a barometer of C-suite confidence. These deals often relate to long-term business objectives, such as product diversification, entering a new market, reaching a new customer, or acquiring new capabilities. They can also require significant investments.

The past few months have seen a resurgence in strategic M&A activity, and we expect this pattern to accelerate into 4Q2025 and 2026 as C-suites gain more clarity and confidence around the macroeconomic and policy backdrops. So far this year, North American acquirers have announced \$820 billion of strategic deals – already surpassing the full-year amounts of 2022–2024 and leaving 2025 on track to generate the most active year for deal-making since 2021 (which was ultimately a record; Exhibit 32). Acquisitions announced by European acquirers have been relatively more muted, by contrast.

Exhibit 32: Strategic M&A has reaccelerated


Announced strategic M&A by North American and European acquirers. Captures deals valued at \$1 billion or more at announcement. Excludes cancelled and withdrawn deals.



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 is as of September 23, 2025.

Exhibit 33: Large M&A so far in 2025 has already surpassed the full years of 2022–2024

Announced strategic M&A deals valued at \$5bn or more at announcement (value and count, RHS), by year. Captures acquirers based in North America and Europe. Excludes cancelled and withdrawn deals.



Source: Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 is as of September 28, 2025.

A less-friendly financing mix for bondholders

Large-scale M&A – or deals valued at \$5bn or more, at announcement – has also reaccelerated in 2025. As Exhibit 33 highlights, both the *value and count* of \$5bn+ deals announced so far in 2025 have surpassed the full-year amounts of 2022-2024.


This is important for bondholders to monitor, as such large transactions often require additional financing from external sources – such as equity or debt issuance. And even when the deals are funded via cash resources already on hand, anecdotal evidence often finds that this liquidity is often ‘replaced’ with debt, at a future date.

As Exhibit 34 shows, the share of all-stock deals announced in 2025 is tracking at its lowest level since 2017. We view this as a reflection of the financial flexibility and debt capacity available to some of the most active acquirers. It also likely reflects the elevated equity market volatility of the past several months.

Sector ‘leadership’ has also shifted so far in 2025, based on our analysis of Dealogic deal-level data. For example, certain sectors have been larger contributors to the 2025 deal-making backdrop, relative to their historical pattern. This includes Transports and Construction. By contrast, sectors which have often been sizable contributors in past years – such as Healthcare and Energy / Utility – are tracking towards a more modest share in 2025. The contribution from Technology and Financials is generally consistent (and sizable). In fact, Technology has represented 22% of deals – the highest share of the post-financial crisis era (and above the previous high watermark of 21% set in 2021).

Exhibit 34: The financing mix of strategic M&A has been somewhat unfriendly for bondholders in 2025

Funding mix of announced strategic M&A by North American and European acquirers. Captures deals valued at \$1bn or more at announcement. Excludes cancelled and withdrawn deals.



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 is as of September 28, 2025.


USD IG supply will be boosted by M&A, Tech

Large-scale M&A tends to be dominated by IG-rated acquirers, as the financial flexibility required to complete such transactions typically maps to the higher end of the rating spectrum. So far this year, 7% of overall USD IG gross supply has been earmarked for acquisitions. This sits at the low end of the historical range, which has spanned from 3% to 17% in the post-financial crisis era. As the announced deals from 2025 are funded (there is typically a several month time lag from a deal's announcement to its subsequent financing), we expect the share of M&A related supply in the USD IG market to increase.

More broadly, gross issuance in the USD IG market is on track for the busiest year since 2020, as shown in Exhibit 35. The activity has been driven, in part, by an acceleration of supply from the Technology sector. Our colleagues in the *BlackRock Investment Institute* have noted that the annual investment in artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and their chips could surpass \$700 billion by 2030. Investment of this scale will create a vital role for both public and private capital markets, in our view.

Exhibit 35: USD IG supply is on track to be the largest since 2020, boosted in part by Technology

USD IG gross supply by sector (\$bn), and share of supply associated with the Technology sector, RHS



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 YTD is as of September 26, 2025.

Private credit: an expanding opportunity set

Fundamentals in aggregate appear solid, albeit with ongoing dispersion

The magnitude of the private opportunity set


Private credit's expansion over the past several years has been driven by a multi-faceted set of growth drivers including: (1) investors' desire for diversification and income, (2) borrowers' desire for customization and partnership, (3) structural shifts in public debt and equity markets, which are serving ever larger borrowers as companies 'stay private for longer,' and (4) an evolution in the bank lending landscape.

As private credit has grown into a sizable, scalable, stand-alone asset class, its role in the financing ecosystem has also evolved. As a result, private credit is no longer reserved for niche financing solutions or lending exclusively to smaller, middle-market corporate borrowers. Rather, it can now reach areas where it previously could not, including larger borrowers with demonstrated access to the liquid (public) corporate debt markets, such as broadly syndicated leveraged loans, high yield (HY) bonds, and even investment grade (IG) bonds.

This expanding addressable market of potential borrowers – across a range of sectors – adds to the significant opportunity set presented by privately held firms, globally. The magnitude of the opportunity in financing private companies is significant.

Exhibit 36: There are over 44,000 private companies across the US, EU, and UK


Count of private and public companies with revenue greater than \$100 million, in the US, EU, and UK



Source: S&P Capital IQ, BlackRock. As of August 19, 2025.

Exhibit 37: The majority of scaled businesses are private, across regions

Share of private and public companies with revenue greater than \$100 million, by count, in the US, EU, and UK



Source: S&P Capital IQ, BlackRock. As of August 19, 2025.

An expanding universe of borrowers

Data from Capital IQ shows that the number of private companies with revenue greater than \$100 million far outpaces public companies in the U.S., E.U., and U.K., both in absolute terms and as a share of total (Exhibits 36 and 37).

The most notable takeaway, in our view, is the sheer quantity and scale of financing opportunities that exist among private companies – over 44,000 across the three regions.

Exhibit 38 puts the size of this business opportunity in dollar terms, capturing the aggregate last-twelve-month (LTM) revenues for public and private companies with revenue greater than \$100 million. The total revenues associated with these private businesses amount to \$40 trillion.


For context, publicly listed companies with more than \$100 million in revenue represent an aggregate of \$35 trillion in LTM revenue in the US, the EU, and the UK (again, Exhibit 38).

And while private companies capture a meaningful opportunity set for financing, the universe is not restricted to non-listed firms. Indeed, we expect an ongoing expansion of private credit's addressable universe of borrowers into cohorts that the syndicated markets have historically serviced.

This expansion of private credit's borrower base has been driven by a key 'feedback loop,' in our view: as experienced managers have captured a larger share of fundraising in recent years, private credit fund sizes have increased accordingly. Data from Preqin shows the average private credit fund size has grown from \$627 million in 2020 to \$1.05 billion in 2024, with the largest managers able to raise funds exceeding \$10 billion in size. This, in turn, has allowed private credit to finance larger deals.

Exhibit 38: Private company annual revenues total \$40 trillion and outpace public company revenues, in aggregate

Aggregate annual revenues for private and public companies, with revenues greater than \$100 million, in the US, EU, and UK, in \$ trillions



Source: S&P Capital IQ, BlackRock. As of August 19, 2025.

Larger funds and more ‘jumbo’ issuance

These larger financings, often referred to as ‘jumbo’ financings, have increased in recent years (Exhibit 39). They generally include larger borrowers – some of which have demonstrated access to the syndicated debt markets. As such, private credit is no longer reserved for smaller, niche financings – as it was in earlier stages of its growth.

With size no longer a binding constraint on private credit’s reach, larger borrowers can benefit from its ability to construct flexible and bespoke financing solutions. This can position private credit as a complement to other financing solutions in the existing capital structure.


While this presents a structural tailwind for upper middle market and larger scale private credit borrowers, we still see a compelling opportunity across the core middle market. Smaller-sized borrowers are increasingly likely, in our view, to rely on private credit for incremental financing that is too small to be considered liquid in the syndicated credit markets (which are serving ever larger borrowers).

We also believe these companies can benefit from the partnership-oriented lending relationship and customized financing as they move through the various stages of their growth journey.

Further, we expect recent periods of episodic market volatility may act as a tailwind in further broadening the addressable market of borrowers accessing private credit for financing solutions. This is largely due to private credit’s ability to provide certainty of execution and terms, flexibility, and customization across the capital structure.

Exhibit 39: The number of ‘jumbo’ loans has increased

Private (‘jumbo’) loans greater than \$1 billion, in the USD market



Source: KBRA DLD, BlackRock. As of September 29, 2025. Includes incremental amounts to existing financings that total \$1 billion or more.

Constructive signaling from fundamentals

Beyond the structural shifts impacting the private financing markets, investors also remain focused on the fundamental trends. The signaling from the most recent data (capturing 2Q2025) has largely been encouraging.

As we discuss in the following slides, our review of the 2Q2025 data released from a range of third-party data sources reveals incremental improvements in interest and fixed charge coverage ratios, realized loss rates that remain below historical average levels, and the largest magnitude of aggregate EBITDA growth in multiple years.


That said, dispersion remains evident across a range of factors, including company size, sector, and vintage. And away from the more ‘traditional’ credit metrics, we are closely monitoring trends – and important nuances – related to payment-in-kind (PIK) utilization, covenant defaults, and non-accrual rates, as potential signposts to watch as catalysts for additional dispersion.

In our view, this underscores the importance of manager selection, credit underwriting and structuring, workout expertise, and origination capabilities, among other variables.

We first start with the Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, which conducts quarterly valuations for over 6,250 portfolio companies and is estimated to capture 30% of all U.S. private equity-backed companies. In 2Q2025, 63.4% of U.S. companies tracked by Lincoln reported an increase in adjusted EBITDA, which is above the historical average of 60.6% (Exhibit 40). Average adjusted EBITDA growth was 6.3%, up from 5.3% in 1Q2025 and the highest level in the last five years. Additionally, the level of EBITDA adjustments in 2Q2025 was not outsized relative to the past few years (again, Exhibit 40).

Exhibit 40: EBITDA growth in 2Q2025 was the highest in the past five years

Adjusted EBITDA growth (last twelve months, year-over-year) for U.S. firms tracked by Lincoln International’s Proprietary Private Market Index, and the magnitude of EBITDA adjustments (RHS)




Source: Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent). © 2025 Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Third-party use is at user's own risk.

Coverage metrics continue to improve

Additionally, as Exhibits 41 and 42 illustrate, interest and fixed charge coverage (FCC) ratios (also tracked by Lincoln International) improved slightly in 2Q2025, extending the trend of the past few quarters. The share of firms with very weak interest coverage ratios (i.e., below 1.0x) declined modestly, while the share of firms with FCC below 1.0x remained stable. We expect incremental improvement over the next few months, as the Fed rate cut delivered in September 2025 filters through to borrowing costs, and presuming economic activity tracks with our constructive base case. This should be visible as 3Q2025 and 4Q2025 data are made available.

Exhibit 41: U.S. private credit interest coverage metrics improved in 2Q2025...


Size-weighted interest coverage ratios for U.S. firms tracked by Lincoln International's Proprietary Private Market Index, and the weighted average share of firms with interest coverage less than 1.0x, RHS



Source: Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent). Interest coverage = LTM EBITDA / Interest. © 2025 Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Third-party use is at user's own risk.

Exhibit 42: ... as did fixed charge ratios

Size-weighted fixed charge coverage (FCC) ratios for U.S. firms tracked by Lincoln International's Proprietary Private Market Index, and the weighted average share of firms with FCC less than 1.0x, RHS



Source: Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025 (most recent). Fixed Charge Coverage = (LTM EBITDA - Taxes - Capex) / (Interest Expense + (1% * Total Debt)). Capital Expenditures ("Capex") utilizes LTM Capex by default. If LTM Capex is not available, NFY Capex is utilized, and LFY Capex if both LTM Capex and NFY Capex are unavailable. © 2025 Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Third-party use is at user's own risk.


Assessing defaults and realized losses

The directional trend in covenant defaults is also monitored by many market participants as a barometer of potential financial pressure within private credit. From early 2023 through late 2024, the aggregate covenant default rate tracked by Lincoln International showed a consistent trend of improvement (i.e., decline). But the covenant default rate has recently increased: to 3.4% as of 2Q2025, compared to 2.2% in 3Q2024, albeit still modestly below the five-year average of 3.6% (Exhibit 43).

That said, a covenant default does not necessarily translate into a monetary default. For this reason, we view realized loss rates as more informative than covenant default rates. As Exhibit 44 illustrates, trailing twelve-month realized losses for the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index were 75bp in 2Q2025, below the 10-year average of 104bp. The Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (CDLI) is an index of over 20,000 USD middle market loan holdings, representing over \$485 billion in assets under management (AUM). We view it as a proxy for the U.S. direct lending market, which is the largest strategy by AUM in the private credit universe (per Preqin).

Exhibit 43: Covenant defaults have increased...

Aggregate size-weighted covenant default rate, and the 5-year historical average, for the U.S. portfolio companies included in the Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database




Source for Exhibit 43: Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025. A default is defined by Lincoln as a covenant default (not necessarily a monetary default). The calculation is size-weighted and considers the total net debt balance for each of the portfolio companies that had a defaulting security in the respective quarter. © 2025 Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Third party use is at user's own risk. **Source for Exhibit 44:** Cliffwater Direct Lending Index, BlackRock. As of June 30, 2025 (most recent available). Realized gains in the CDLI can be driven by equity stubs, warrants, and gains on exited investments. These were more common in 2005-2007, when second lien and mezzanine loans were a greater portion of the CDLI. **The figures shown relate to past performance. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of current or future results.** Index performance returns do not reflect any management fees, transaction costs, or expenses. Indices are unmanaged, and one cannot invest directly in an index.

FOR PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED, INSTITUTIONAL AND WHOLESALE INVESTORS / QUALIFIED CLIENTS USE ONLY

Exhibit 44: ...but realized losses are contained

Trailing 12-month interest income return and realized gains (losses) for the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (CDLI)




The nuances surrounding 'PIK'

Many market participants also monitor payment-in-kind (PIK) utilization for incremental insight into potential fundamental pressures and possible catalysts for additional dispersion. PIK interest is defined as interest that is 'paid' in the form of additional non-cash principal, as opposed to cash interest. While there are various ways to track PIK utilization, we believe monitoring PIK as a percentage of total interest income is among the most informative. Exhibit 45 demonstrates this metric for the CDLI.

That said, the label of 'PIK' is nuanced. An analysis from Lincoln International draws a distinction between so-called 'good PIK' and 'bad PIK.' When included as an option for a borrower in the *original* credit documents (to provide additional flexibility to invest in near-term growth prospects), the presence of PIK may not, in isolation, signal stress. This would be considered 'good PIK.' By contrast, PIK that is amended into a credit agreement *after origination* may indicate (unanticipated) stress (i.e., 'bad PIK'). As of 2Q2025, Lincoln International estimates that 11% of investments reviewed have a PIK option, and about half of those with a PIK option have 'bad PIK', which was added after the time of underwriting (Exhibit 46).

Exhibit 45: PIK as a percentage of total interest income has remained range-bound since 2021


Payment-in-Kind (PIK) as a percentage of total interest income for the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index



Source: Cliffwater Direct Lending Index, BlackRock. As of June 30, 2025 (most recent).

Exhibit 46: The share of investments with 'bad PIK' has edged down vs. late 2024

For the U.S. companies tracked by Lincoln International, the share of total investments with PIK interest, and the share of PIK-paying investments with 'bad PIK' (i.e., without PIK at close), RHS



Source: Lincoln International Proprietary Private Market Database, BlackRock. As of 2Q2025. © 2025 Lincoln Partners Advisors LLC. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Third-party use is at user's own risk. Data represented above considered Senior and Unitranche Term Loans.

Sponsor M&A has room to accelerate

After a sluggish start to the year, sponsor-related M&A volumes have accelerated and are on pace to exceed the full-year 2024 levels, as shown in Exhibit 47.

The relative share of sponsor-related deal-making, as a percentage of overall M&A, has also rebounded to 38%, using data sourced from Dealogic. This now ranks above the 10-year average (2014-2024) of 35%, when using a universe of deals valued at \$100 million or more at announcement, for sponsors in North America and Europe.


We see scope for the pace of sponsor-related M&A activity to broaden, given the macroeconomic and policy factors outlined earlier.

For example, data sourced from PitchBook shows that private equity (PE) exit activity has generally been contained to the largest assets and hasn't yet encompassed a wide range of portfolio companies. To us, this suggests that PE general partners are likely prioritizing 'exiting' their largest and highest quality assets given the market volatility, as higher interest rates and intermittent concerns about a slowdown in global growth weighed on financial sponsors' ability to exit existing investments in recent years.

We believe a 'valuations expectations gap' between buyers and sellers has played a role in the muted activity and see potential for this gap to narrow in the coming quarters. This could provide incremental financing opportunities for private credit lenders over the medium term.

Exhibit 47: Sponsor-related deal making has room to run, in our view

Sponsor-related deal volumes (\$bn), by type, for North American and European financial sponsors. Captures deals valued at \$100 million or more, at announcement. Excludes cancelled or withdrawn deals.



Source: Dealogic (ION Analytics), BlackRock. 2025 YTD is as of September 28, 2025. A deal is classified as a sponsor-related transaction if a financial sponsor is involved as a buyer or a seller. These figures will double-count transactions, in some instances (i.e., an investment captured as an entry and exit, by two different financial sponsors).


Watching for a broadening in PE exits

Exhibit 48 illustrates the progressive decline in the U.S. PE exits / investments ratio. The impact of lower PE exit volumes is also evident in the aging of PE inventories. Today, PE inventory has grown to more than 12,500 portfolio companies, with 33% of PE-backed company inventory being 7 years or older, according to Pitchbook LCD (Exhibit 49). This has resulted in increased interest from some market participants in secondaries funds and continuation vehicles, to unlock liquidity.

Returning capital to limited partners (LPs) can support PE fundraising volumes, as LPs may reinvest this capital into a newer fund vintage. In a January 2025 McKinsey survey of 333 LPs, 2.5 times as many LPs ranked distributions to paid-in capital (DPI) as a “most critical” performance metric, vs. three years ago.

Exhibit 48: PE investments have outpaced PE exits


Count of U.S. PE exits / count of U.S. PE investments



Source: Pitchbook LCD, BlackRock. YTD 2025 is through 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 30, 2025).

Exhibit 49: A share of PE investments have aged beyond several years

U.S. private equity-backed company inventory, by deal year



Source: Pitchbook LCD, BlackRock. YTD 2025 is through 2Q2025 (most recent as of September 30, 2025).

Commercial real estate: adapting to higher rates

Watching transaction volumes and refinancing of extended loans

CRE prices continue to stabilize

Commercial real estate (CRE) has undergone significant shifts in recent years, driven in part by its sensitivity to interest rate dynamics. For example, since the Federal Reserve's interest rate hiking cycle began in 2022, CRE asset prices have, in many cases, retraced gains made from 2020 to 2022. The repricing of assets to reflect higher borrowing costs has kept market participants focused on the pace and shape of CRE's recovery.


To date, CRE asset prices, as assessed by Real Capital Analytics Commercial Property Price Indices (RCA CPPI), have not seen a "V-shaped" recovery, but rather the recovery appears to be slow-moving and uneven across and within property types (Exhibit 50). This includes Central Business District (CBD) offices, which experienced the most significant decline and lagged in stabilization relative to other property types covered by the indices.

Recent data through August 2025 demonstrate that this trend of stability has continued, with some prices even modestly *recovering* in recent months, indicating what may become a 'trough' in values, relative to declines for some property types that began in 2022. That said, we expect the directional recovery of CRE to be slow. As such, we anticipate further fluctuations in both transaction activity and property values may occur, especially as residual stress continues to work its way through the asset class.

Of course, CRE is considerably nuanced, including across property types. Indeed, each property type is subject to its own set of performance drivers, as demonstrated by the dispersion in pricing values in Exhibit 50. For example, values for industrial properties have gained considerably since 2019, achieving a sizable cumulative outperformance relative to other asset classes over the period, driven by factors such as domestic supply chain build-outs, for example.

Exhibit 50: Data shows stabilization in CRE asset values, albeit with dispersion by category

Cumulative percent change in the level of the Real Capital Analytics Commercial Property Price Indices (RCA CPPI), since January 2019



Source: Real Capital Analytics, BlackRock. As of August 31, 2025 (most recent available).

Adapting to higher interest rates


A Preqin survey of over 450 institutional investors also suggests that CRE asset prices may be stabilizing. For example, 40% of respondents noted that asset prices have fallen versus 12 months ago, down from 66% in June 2024. Further, the share of respondents who view asset prices as higher than 12 months ago grew modestly to 21% in June 2025, from only 12% in June 2024. Preqin's survey also highlighted that institutional investors have lowered return expectations for real estate investment portfolios compared to last year (Exhibit 52).

Interest rates and asset valuations remain the top two areas of concern for CRE investors over the next 12 months – consistent with the last three years. As we've detailed, these two factors are closely intertwined for CRE. That said, the share of respondents highlighting interest rates as a key challenge fell by 16 percentage points YoY, from 78% to 62%, suggesting that investors are becoming increasingly comfortable with a backdrop of structurally higher interest rates. This should be supportive in addressing the sizable upcoming maturities of CRE loans over the next few years (including recent extensions, as detailed in Exhibits 53 and 54).

Notable, too, concerns related to currency, commodity, and stock market volatility remain muted, despite the uptick in uncertainty in the months preceding the June survey. This underscores the relative stability of an allocation to real assets such as CRE, even amid broader macro volatility.

Exhibit 51: Price adjustments are moderating


Investors were asked: 'How has (CRE) asset pricing changed vs. 12 months ago?'



Source: Preqin Investor Surveys June 2022 - 2025, BlackRock.

Exhibit 52: Two-thirds of investors are targeting CRE returns of 10% or less

Institutional investors' targeted returns for real estate portfolios



Source: Preqin Investor Surveys June 2024 - 2025, BlackRock.

CRE loan maturity walls and extensions

Exhibit 53: Banks represent the largest lender segment for upcoming maturities

Volume of maturing commercial property loans, by lender type, in \$ billions





Exhibit 54: Extended and upcoming maturities are diversified across property types

Volume of maturing U.S. commercial property loans, by property type, in \$ billions



For both charts: Source: Real Capital Analytics, MSCI Real Assets, BlackRock. Based on independent reports of properties and portfolios \$2.5 million and greater. Data believed to be accurate but not guaranteed. Data is as of September 23, 2025, and reflects the market as of June 30, 2025. **For Exhibit 53:** 'Bank' includes international, national, and regional/local. 'Other' includes CLOs and private, among others. **For Exhibit 54:** 'Other' includes development sites, senior housing and care, among others.


Activity diverges across regions

Our analysis highlights an ongoing recovery in transaction volumes – extending the trend we last highlighted in May. That said, as we’ve observed in other asset classes (including private and syndicated credit), there is considerable dispersion, including by property type and across regions. For example, quarterly transaction volumes in the U.S. improved modestly in 2Q2025, rising 9% QoQ and 11% YoY, as shown in Exhibit 55. Despite improvements, overall deal volume remains at just 82% of the quarterly average for 2016–2019, suggesting significant room for additional recovery, in our view, as incremental clarity on the macroeconomic backdrop narrows the so-called ‘expectations gap’ between buyers and sellers.

In Europe, a recovery in transaction volume has been somewhat more muted, thus far. 2Q2025 transaction volume was stable QoQ but declined 10% YoY (Exhibit 56). Further, activity remains at only 56% of the 2016–2019 quarterly average. Here too, we see scope for continued progress on recovery. Anecdotally, while only a small segment of overall deal volume today, data centers are increasingly capturing market attention. Such volume is captured by the “other” segments of Exhibits 55 and 56 and remains small and lumpy relative to other property types. That said, we see continued enthusiasm and investment around the property type as a potential tailwind to growth.

Exhibit 55: U.S. CRE transaction activity grew modestly in 2Q2025...


U.S. CRE transaction volume by property type, in \$ billions



Source: Real Capital Analytics, BlackRock. Captures data through 2Q2025. Other include hotels, dev sites, seniors housing & care, and data centers.

Exhibit 56: ...while activity remained more muted in Europe

European CRE transaction volume by property type, in € billions



Source: Real Capital Analytics, BlackRock. Captures data through 2Q2025. Other include hotels, dev sites, seniors housing & care, and data centers.

Unless otherwise stated, all reference to \$ are in USD.

Risk Warnings:

Capital at risk. The value of investments and the income from them can fall as well as rise and are not guaranteed. You may not get back the amount originally invested.

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of current or future results and should not be the sole factor of consideration when selecting a product or strategy.

Changes in the rates of exchange between currencies may cause the value of investments to diminish or increase. Fluctuation may be particularly marked in the case of a higher volatility fund and the value of an investment may fall suddenly and substantially. Levels and basis of taxation may change from time to time.

Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (CDLI) is an index that assists investors to better understand private credit as an asset class. The CDLI seeks to measure the unlevered, gross of fees performance of U.S. middle market corporate loans, as represented by the underlying assets of Business Development Companies ("BDCs"), including both exchange-traded and unlisted BDCs, subject to certain eligibility criteria. The CDLI is an asset-weighted index that is calculated on a quarterly basis using financial statements and other information contained in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings of all eligible BDCs. Eligibility is set as all assets held by BDCs that (1) are regulated by the SEC as a BDC under the Investment Company Act of 1940; (2) have a substantial majority (approximately 75%) of reported total assets represented by direct loans made to corporate borrowers, as categorized by each BDC and subject to Cliffwater's discretion, and (3) file SEC form 10-Q (or 10-K, as applicable) within 75 (or 90) calendar days following the current Valuation Date. If a BDC meets the eligibility criteria, but has not filed its report on Form 10-K or 10-Q with the SEC at the time the index is reconstituted, asset information from its report will be included in the index at the time of the next reconstitution. This information is derived from sources that are considered reliable, but BlackRock does not guarantee the veracity, currency, completeness or accuracy of this information.

Important Information:

In the U.S., this material is for institutional use only – not for public distribution.

In Canada, this material is intended for permitted clients as defined under Canadian securities law, is for educational purposes only, does not constitute investment advice and should not be construed as a solicitation or offering of units of any fund or other security in any jurisdiction.

In China, this material may not be distributed to individuals resident in the People's Republic of China ("PRC", for such purposes, not applicable to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) or entities registered in the PRC unless such parties have received all the required PRC government approvals to participate in any investment or receive any investment advisory or investment management services.

In Singapore, this document is provided by BlackRock (Singapore) Limited (company registration number:200010143N) for use only with institutional investors as defined in Section 4A of the Securities and Futures Act, Chapter 289 of Singapore. This advertisement or publication has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

In Hong Kong, this material is issued by BlackRock Asset Management North Asia Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong. This material is for distribution to "Professional Investors" (as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap.571 of the laws of Hong Kong) and any rules made under that ordinance.) and should not be relied upon by any other persons or redistributed to retail clients in Hong Kong.

In Japan, this is issued by BlackRock Japan. Co., Ltd. (Financial Instruments Business Operator: The Kanto Regional Financial Bureau. License No375, Association Memberships: Japan Investment Advisers Association, The Investment Trusts Association, Japan, Japan Securities Dealers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association) for Institutional Investors only. All strategies or products BLK Japan offer through the discretionary investment contracts or through investment trust funds do not guarantee the principal amount invested. The risks and costs of each strategy or product we offer cannot be indicated here because the financial instruments in which they are invested vary each strategy or product. Therefore, before deciding to receive our strategies or products, please refer to the document provided prior to the execution of agreement, prospectus, terms and conditions of investment trust and the explanatory document, etc. that will be delivered to you in accordance with each offering model and confirm the contents thereof.

In South Korea, this information is issued by BlackRock Investment (Korea) Limited. This material is for distribution to the Qualified Professional Investors (as defined in the Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act and its sub-regulations) and for information or educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sells in any securities or any investment strategies.

In **Brunei**, BlackRock does not hold a Capital Markets Services License and is therefore not licensed for conducting business in any regulated activity under the Securities Market Order, 2013. This document has been issued by BlackRock and is intended for the exclusive use of the recipient. The distribution of the information contained herein may be restricted by law and persons who access it are required to comply with any such restrictions. The information provided herein information is directed solely at persons who would be regarded as “Accredited Investors”, “Expert Investors” or “Institutional Investors” in accordance with the Securities Market Order 2013.

n **Australia & New Zealand**, issued by BlackRock Investment Management (Australia) Limited ABN 13 006 165 975, AFSL 230 523 (BIMAL) for the exclusive use of the recipient, who warrants by receipt of this material that they are a wholesale client as defined under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the New Zealand Financial Advisers Act 2008 respectively. BIMAL is not licensed by a New Zealand regulator to provide ‘Financial Advice Service’ ‘Investment manager under an FMC offer’ or ‘Keeping, investing, administering, or managing money, securities, or investment portfolios on behalf of other persons’. BIMAL’s registration on the New Zealand register of financial service providers does not mean that BIMAL is subject to active regulation or oversight by a New Zealand regulator. This material provides general advice only and does not take into account your individual objectives, financial situation, needs or circumstances. Before making any investment decision, you should therefore assess whether the material is appropriate for you and obtain financial advice tailored to you having regard to your individual objectives, financial situation, needs and circumstances. Refer to BIMAL’s Financial Services Guide on its website for more information. This material is not a financial product recommendation or an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any financial product in any jurisdiction. This material is not intended for distribution to, or use by, any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution or use would be contrary to local law or regulation. BIMAL is a part of the global BlackRock Group which comprises of financial product issuers and investment managers around the world. BIMAL is the issuer of financial products and acts as an investment manager in Australia. BIMAL does not offer financial products to persons in New Zealand who are retail investors (as that term is defined in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMCA)). This material does not constitute or relate to such an offer. To the extent that this material does constitute or relate to such an offer of financial products, the offer is only made to, and capable of acceptance by, persons in New Zealand who are wholesale investors (as that term is defined in the FMCA). BIMAL, its officers, employees and agents believe that the information in this material and the sources on which it is based (which may be sourced from third parties) are correct as at the date of publication. While every care has been taken in the preparation of this material, no warranty of accuracy or reliability is given and no responsibility for the information is accepted by BIMAL, its officers, employees or agents. Except where contrary to law, BIMAL excludes all liability for this information.

In **Central America**, these securities have not been registered before the Securities Superintendence of the Republic of Panama, nor did the offer, sale or their trading procedures. The registration exemption has made according to numeral 3 of Article 129 of the Consolidated Text containing of the Decree-Law No. 1 of July 8, 1999 (institutional investors). Consequently, the tax treatment set forth in Articles 334 to 336 of the Unified Text containing Decree-Law No. 1 of July 8, 1999, does not apply to them. These securities are not under the supervision of the Securities Superintendence of the Republic of Panama. The information contained herein does not describe any product that is supervised or regulated by the National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS) in Honduras. Therefore any investment described herein is done at the investor’s own risk. This is an individual and private offer which is made in Costa Rica upon reliance on an exemption from registration before the General Superintendence of Securities (“SUGEVAL”), pursuant to articles 7 and 8 of the Regulations on the Public Offering of Securities (“Reglamento sobre Oferta Pública de Valores”). This information is confidential, and is not to be reproduced or distributed to third parties as this is NOT a public offering of securities in Costa Rica. The product being offered is not intended for the Costa Rican public or market and neither is registered or will be registered before the SUGEVAL, nor can be traded in the secondary market. If any recipient of this documentation receives this document in El Salvador, such recipient acknowledges that the same has been delivered upon his request and instructions, and on a private placement basis. For Guatemala Investors, This communication and any accompanying information (the “Materials”) are intended solely for informational purposes and do not constitute (and should not be interpreted to constitute) the offering, selling, or conducting of business with respect to such securities, products or services in the jurisdiction of the addressee (this “Jurisdiction”), or the conducting of any brokerage, banking, or other similarly regulated activities (“Financial Activities”) in the Jurisdiction. Neither BLACKROCK, nor the securities, products and services described herein, are registered (or intended to be registered) in the Jurisdiction. Furthermore, neither BLACKROCK, nor the securities, products, services, or activities described herein, are regulated, or supervised by any governmental or similar authority in the Jurisdiction. The Materials are private, confidential and are sent by BLACKROCK only for the exclusive use of the addressee. The Materials must not be publicly distributed and any use of the Materials by anyone other than the addressee is not authorized. The addressee is required to comply with all applicable laws in the Jurisdiction, including, without limitation, tax laws and exchange control regulations if any.

The information provided within this document is for education purposes only in **Bermuda**. This information is not intended for distribution to, or use by, any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction or country.

In **Latin America**, for institutional investors and financial intermediaries only (not for public distribution). This material is for educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or an offer or solicitation to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any shares of any fund or security and it is your responsibility to inform yourself of, and to observe, all applicable laws and regulations of your relevant jurisdiction. If any funds are mentioned or inferred in this material, such funds may not be registered with the securities regulators of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay or any other securities regulator in any Latin American country and thus, may not be publicly offered in any such countries. The securities regulators of any country within Latin America have not confirmed the accuracy of any information contained herein. No information discussed herein can be provided to the general public in Latin America. The contents of this material are strictly confidential and must not be passed to any third party.

In **Colombia**, the promotion of each product discussed herein is carried out through the Representative Office of BlackRock Fund Advisors, authorized by the Colombian Financial Superintendence. The transmission of this information does not constitute a securities public offering in Colombia. The products discussed herein may not be promoted or marketed in Colombia or to Colombian residents unless such promotion and marketing is made in compliance with Decree 2555 of 2010 and other applicable rules and regulations related to the promotion of foreign financial and/or securities related products or services in Colombia. With the receipt of these materials, and unless the Client contacts BlackRock with additional requests for information, the Client agrees to have been provided the information for due advisory required by the marketing and promotion regulatory regime applicable in Colombia.

In **Chile**, The securities if any described in this document are foreign securities, therefore: i) their rights and obligations will be subject to the legal framework of the issuer's country of origin, and therefore, investors must inform themselves regarding the form and means through which they may exercise their rights; and that ii) the supervision of the Commission for the Financial Market (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero or "CMF") will be concentrated exclusively on compliance with the information obligations established in General Standard No. 352 of the CMF and that, therefore, the supervision of the security and its issuer will be mainly made by the foreign regulator; In the case of a fund not registered with the CMF is subject to General Rule No. 336 issued by the SVS (now the CMF). The subject matter of this sale may include securities not registered with the CMF; therefore, such securities are not subject to the supervision of the CMF. Since the securities are not registered in Chile, there is no obligation of the issuer to make publicly available information about the securities in Chile. The securities shall not be subject to public offering in Chile unless registered with the relevant registry of the CMF.

IN MEXICO, FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND QUALIFIED INVESTORS USE ONLY. INVESTING INVOLVES RISK, INCLUDING POSSIBLE LOSS OF PRINCIPAL. THIS MATERIAL IS PROVIDED FOR EDUCATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER OR SOLICITATION TO SELL OR A SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY ANY SHARES OF ANY FUND OR SECURITY. This information does not consider the investment objectives, risk tolerance or the financial circumstances of any specific investor. This information does not replace the obligation of financial advisor to apply his/her best judgment in making investment decisions or investment recommendations. It is your responsibility to inform yourself of, and to observe, all applicable laws and regulations of Mexico. If any funds, securities or investment strategies are mentioned or inferred in this material, such funds, securities or strategies have not been registered with the Mexican National Banking and Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, the "CNBV") and thus, may not be publicly offered in Mexico. The CNBV has not confirmed the accuracy of any information contained herein. The provision of investment management and investment advisory services ("Investment Services") is a regulated activity in Mexico, subject to strict rules, and performed under the supervision of the CNBV. These materials are shared for information purposes only, do not constitute investment advice, and are being shared in the understanding that the addressee is an Institutional or Qualified investor as defined under Mexican Securities (Ley del Mercado de Valores). Each potential investor shall make its own investment decision based on their own analysis of the available information. Please note that by receiving these materials, it shall be construed as a representation by the receiver that it is an Institutional or Qualified investor as defined under Mexican law. BlackRock México Operadora, S.A. de C.V., Sociedad Operadora de Fondos de Inversión ("BlackRock México Operadora") is a Mexican subsidiary of BlackRock, Inc., authorized by the CNBV as a Mutual Fund Manager (Operadora de Fondos), and as such, authorized to manage Mexican mutual funds, ETFs and provide Investment Advisory Services. For more information on the Investment Services offered by BlackRock Mexico, please review our Investment Services Guide available in www.blackrock.com/mx. This material represents an assessment at a specific time and its information should not be relied upon by the you as research or investment advice regarding the funds, any security or investment strategy in particular. Reliance upon information in this material is at your sole discretion. BlackRock México is not authorized to receive deposits, carry out intermediation activities, or act as a broker dealer, or bank in Mexico. For more information on BlackRock México, please visit: www.blackrock.com/mx. BlackRock receives revenue in the form of advisory fees for our advisory services and management fees for our mutual funds, exchange traded funds and collective investment trusts. Any modification, change, distribution or inadequate use of information of this document is not responsibility of BlackRock or any of its affiliates. Pursuant to the Mexican Data Privacy Law (Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de Particulares), to register your personal data you must confirm that you have read and understood the Privacy Notice of BlackRock México Operadora. For the full disclosure, please visit www.blackrock.com/mx and accept that your personal information will be managed according with the terms and conditions set forth therein.

In **Peru**, this private offer does not constitute a public offer, and is not registered with the Securities Market Public Registry of the Peruvian Securities Market Commission, for use only with institutional investors as such term is defined by the Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP.

This material is for distribution to Professional Clients (as defined by the Financial Conduct Authority or MiFID Rules) only and should not be relied upon by any other persons.

In the UK and Non-European Economic Area (EEA) countries: this is Issued by BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited, authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Registered office: 12 Throgmorton Avenue, London, EC2N 2DL. Tel: + 44 (0)20 7743 3000. Registered in England and Wales No. 02020394. For your protection telephone calls are usually recorded. Please refer to the Financial Conduct Authority website for a list of authorised activities conducted by BlackRock.

In the European Economic Area (EEA): This document is marketing material. This is Issued by BlackRock (Netherlands) B.V. and is authorised and regulated by the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets. Registered office Amstelplein 1, 1096 HA, Amsterdam, Tel: 020 – 549 5200, Tel: 31-20-549-5200. Trade Register No. 17068311 For your protection telephone calls are usually recorded.

In **Switzerland**: This document shall be exclusively made available to, and directed at, qualified investors as defined in Article 10 (3) of the CISA of 23 June 2006, as amended, at the exclusion of qualified investors with an opting-out pursuant to Art. 5 (1) of the Swiss Federal Act on Financial Services ("FinSA"). For information on art. 8 / 9 Financial Services Act (FinSA) and on your client segmentation under art. 4 FinSA, please see the following website: www.blackrock.com/finsa.

In **Israel**: BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited is not licenced under Israel's Regulation of Investment Advice, Investment Marketing and Portfolio Management Law, 5755-1995 (the "Advice Law"), nor does it carry insurance thereunder.

In the **DIFC**: This document is intended strictly for Professional Clients as defined under the Dubai Financial Services Authority ("DFSA") Conduct of Business (COB) Rules. BlackRock Advisors (UK) Limited –Dubai Branch is a DIFC Foreign Recognised Company registered with the DIFC Registrar of Companies (DIFC Registered Number 546), with its office at Unit L15 - 01A, ICD Brookfield Place, Dubai International Financial Centre, PO Box 506661, Dubai, UAE, and is regulated by the DFSA to engage in the regulated activities of 'Advising on Financial Products' and 'Arranging Deals in Investments' in or from the DIFC, both of which are limited to units in a collective investment fund (DFSA Reference Number F000738).

In **Saudi Arabia**, This document is intended for Institutional and Qualified Clients (as defined by the Capital Market Authority) only and should not be relied upon by any other persons. BlackRock Saudi Arabia, authorised and regulated by the Capital Market Authority (License Number 18- 192-30). Registered office: 7976 Salim Ibn Abi Bakr Shaikan St, 2223 West Umm Al Hamam District Riyadh, 12329 Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tel: +966 11 838 3600. CR No, 1010479419. For your protection telephone calls are usually recorded. Please refer to the Capital Market Authority website for a list of authorised activities conducted by BlackRock Saudi Arabia.

In **Bahrain**: The information contained in this document is intended strictly for sophisticated institutions

In the **United Arab Emirates (UAE) (excluding the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM))**:

Abu Dhabi Global Markets

This communication is sent strictly within the context of, and constitutes, an Exempt Communication under the Financial Services and Markets Regulations 2015 (as amended).

In the **State of Qatar and the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC)**: This document is intended strictly for sophisticated institutions.

In **Kuwait**: This document is intended strictly for sophisticated institutions that are 'Professional Clients' as defined under the Kuwait Capital Markets Law and its Executive Bylaws.

The information contained in this document, does not constitute and should not be construed as an offer of, invitation or proposal to make an offer for, recommendation to apply for or an opinion or guidance on a financial product, service and/or strategy. Whilst great care has been taken to ensure that the information contained in this document is accurate, no responsibility can be accepted for any errors, mistakes or omissions or for any action taken in reliance thereon. You may only reproduce, circulate and use this document (or any part of it) with the consent of BlackRock Investment Management (UK). The information contained in this document is for information purposes only. It is not intended for and should not be distributed to, or relied upon by, members of the public.

The information contained in this document, may contain statements that are not purely historical in nature but are "forward-looking statements". These include, amongst other things, projections, forecasts or estimates of income. These forward-looking statements are based upon certain assumptions, some of which are described in other relevant documents or materials. If you do not understand the contents of this document, you should consult an authorised financial adviser. Any research in this document has been procured and may have been acted on by BlackRock for its own purpose. The results of such research are being made available only incidentally. The views expressed do not constitute investment or any other advice and are subject to change. They do not necessarily reflect the views of any company in the BlackRock Group or any part thereof and no assurances are made as to their accuracy. Any opinions, forecasts represent an assessment of the market environment at a specific time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. This information should not be relied upon by the reader as research, investment advice or a recommendation. This document is for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer or invitation to anyone to invest in any BlackRock funds and has not been prepared in connection with any such offer. If you are an intermediary or third-party distributor, you must only disseminate this material to other Professional Investors as permitted in the above-specified jurisdictions and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Certain information contained herein has been obtained from published sources and from third parties, including without limitation, market forecasts, internal and external surveys, market research, publicly available information and industry publications. In addition, certain information contained herein may have been obtained from companies in which investments have been made by entities affiliated with BlackRock. Although such information is believed to be reliable for the purposes used herein, neither the Fund nor BlackRock assumes any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Reliance upon information in this material is at the sole discretion of the reader. Certain information contained herein represents or is based upon forward-looking statements or information. BlackRock and its affiliates believe that such statements and information are based upon reasonable estimates and assumptions. However, forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain, and factors may cause events or results to differ from those projected. Therefore, undue reliance should not be placed on such forward-looking statements and information.

© 2025 BlackRock, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK SOLUTIONS, iSHARES, BUILD ON BLACKROCK and SO WHAT DO I DO WITH MY MONEY are trademarks of BlackRock, Inc. or its affiliates. All other trademarks are those of their respective owners.