

BlackRock Investment Stewardship

Global Principles for Benchmark Policies

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The purpose of this document is to provide an overarching explanation of BlackRock’s global approach to our responsibilities as a shareholder on behalf of our clients, the principles that guide our dialogue with companies, and our commitments to clients in terms of our own governance and transparency.

Introduction to BlackRock Investment Stewardship

BlackRock's clients depend on us to help them meet their varied investment goals. We consider it one of our responsibilities to be an informed, engaged shareholder on their behalf, given the business decisions that companies make have a direct impact on our clients' long-term investment outcomes and financial well-being. BlackRock Investment Stewardship (BIS) is a dedicated function within BlackRock, which is responsible for engaging with public companies on behalf of index strategies. Investment Stewardship is one of the ways we fulfill our fiduciary responsibilities as an asset manager to our clients. Our sole objective when conducting our stewardship program is to advance our clients' long-term financial interests.¹

BIS takes a long-term approach in our stewardship efforts, reflecting the investment horizons of the majority of our clients. BIS does this through:

1. Engaging with companies in a two-way dialogue to build our understanding of a company's practices and inform our voting decisions.
2. Voting at shareholder meetings on management and shareholder proposals on behalf of clients who have delegated voting authority to BlackRock.
3. Contributing to industry dialogue on stewardship to share our perspectives on matters that may impact our clients' investments.
4. Reporting on our activities to inform clients about our stewardship efforts on their behalf through a range of publications and direct reporting.

Philosophy on investment stewardship

Sound governance is critical to the success of a company, the protection of investors' interests, and long-term financial value creation. Research indicates that high-performing companies will effectively evaluate and address risks and opportunities relevant to their businesses, which supports durable, long-term financial value creation.²

Setting, executing, and overseeing strategy are the responsibility of management and the board. As one of many minority shareholders, BlackRock cannot – and does not try to – direct a company's strategy or its implementation. Our role, on behalf of BlackRock's clients as long-term investors, is to better understand how corporate leadership is managing material risks and capitalizing on opportunities to help protect and enhance the company's ability to deliver long-term financial returns. We aim to take a globally consistent approach, while recognizing the unique markets and sectors in which companies operate.

¹ BIS' Benchmark Policies, and the vote decisions made consistent with these policies, take a financial materiality-based approach and are focused solely on advancing clients' financial interests. BIS' Benchmark Policies – comprised of the BIS [Global Principles](#), [regional voting guidelines](#), and [engagement priorities](#) – apply to clients' assets invested through index strategies and provide guidance on our position on common corporate governance matters. We take a globally consistent approach, while recognizing the unique markets and sectors in which companies operate. BlackRock offers a wide range of investment products and funds to support our clients' unique and varied investment objectives. Other materials on the BIS [website](#) might also provide useful context.

² PwC, "The 3 things all high-performing companies do". Harvard Business Review, "[6 Strategic Concepts That Set High-Performing Companies Apart](#)", March 2024.

Shareholder rights

Corporate law, regulations and listing rules in most markets establish certain fundamental rights attached to shareholding. Shareholders should have the right to:

- Elect, remove, and nominate directors, approve the appointment of the auditor, and amend the corporate charter or by-laws.
- Vote on key board decisions that are material to the protection of their investment, including but not limited to, changes to the purpose of the business, dilution levels and pre-emptive rights, and the distribution of income and capital structure.
- Access sufficient and timely information on material governance, strategic, and business matters to make informed decisions.

To protect the interest of minority shareholders like BlackRock's clients, BIS holds the view that shareholder voting rights should be proportionate to economic ownership—the principle of “one share, one vote” helps to achieve this balance.

Stewardship in practice

The assets BlackRock manages belong to our clients, which include public and private pension plans, insurers, official institutions, endowments, universities, charities, family offices, wealth managers, and ultimately, the individual investors that they serve. Through stewardship, we assess how companies are creating long-term financial value to serve our clients, many of whom are saving for long-term goals, such as retirement.

As shareholders of public companies, our clients have the right to vote on matters proposed by a company's management or its shareholders. Voting is an important mechanism for investors to express support for, or concern about, a company's performance and most of our clients authorize BlackRock to exercise this right on their behalf. For those clients, and as a fiduciary, BlackRock is legally required to make proxy voting determinations in a manner that is consistent with their investment objectives. BIS does this by casting votes in favor of proposals that, in our assessment, will promote stronger governance and better operating practices and, in turn, potentially enhance long-term shareholder value. Our vote decisions are informed by our in-depth analysis of company disclosures, engagement with boards and management teams, third-party research, and comparisons against a company's industry peers.

BIS takes a constructive, long-term approach to our engagement with companies, reflecting the investment horizons of the majority of our clients. An engagement is a meeting between BIS and a company's board and management that helps improve our understanding of the company's business model and material risks and opportunities, to inform our voting decisions on behalf of clients who authorize us to vote on their behalf. In these two-way conversations, we listen to and learn directly from company directors and executives and ask questions relevant to their business. Either a company or BIS can request an engagement. Many of the engagements are initiated by companies to discuss their long-term strategy, risk and opportunity set, and management's plan to deliver financial returns through business cycles. The ongoing, multiyear nature of our engagements allows us to build strong relationships with company leadership and mutual understanding on key matters of corporate governance and the drivers of long-term financial performance.

Generally, we support the vote recommendations of the board of directors and management. In case of concerns, we typically raise these through dialogue with board members and management teams first.

When we determine it is in our clients' financial interests to convey concern to companies through voting, we do so in two forms: we might not support the election of directors or other management proposals, or we might not support management's voting recommendation on a shareholder proposal.

Key themes

While accepted standards and norms of corporate governance can differ between markets, in our experience, there are certain globally applicable fundamental elements of corporate governance that contribute to a company's ability to create long-term financial value for shareholders. These global themes are set out in this overarching set of principles (the "Principles"), which are anchored in transparency and accountability.

At a minimum, it is our view that companies should observe the accepted corporate governance standards in their domestic market,³ and we ask that, if they do not, they explain how their approach better supports durable, long-term financial value creation.

These Principles cover seven key subjects:

- Boards and directors
- Auditors and audit-related issues
- Capital structure, mergers, asset sales, and other special transactions
- Executive compensation
- Material sustainability-related risks and opportunities
- Other corporate governance matters and shareholder protections
- Shareholder proposals

Our regional and market-specific voting guidelines explain how these Principles inform our voting decisions in relation to common ballot items for shareholder meetings in those markets. Alongside the Principles and regional voting guidelines, BIS publishes our engagement priorities which reflect the five themes on which we most frequently engage companies, where they are relevant, as these can be a source of material business risk or opportunity. Collectively, these BIS policies set out the core elements of corporate governance that guide our investment stewardship program globally and within each market. The BIS policies are not prescriptive, applied on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, taking into consideration a number of factors, including the sector, market, and business environment within which a company is operating.

³ Our regional voting guidelines, which we publish on the BIS website, reflect these different market standards and norms. Depending on the market, generally accepted practice is informed by corporate law, market regulation, best practices, and industry initiatives, amongst other factors.

Boards and directors

Companies whose boards are comprised of appropriately qualified, engaged directors with professional characteristics relevant to a company's business enhance the ability of the board to add value and be the voice of shareholders in board discussions. A strong board gives a company a competitive advantage, providing valuable oversight and contributing to the most important management decisions that support long-term financial performance. As part of their responsibilities, board members have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to oversee the strategic direction, operations, and risk management of a company. This is why our investment stewardship efforts have always started with the performance of the board of directors, and why we see engagement with, and the election of, directors as one of our most important responsibilities. We engage, as necessary, with members of the board's nominating and/or governance committee to assess whether governance practices and board composition are appropriate given a company's business model and we take into consideration a number of factors, including the sector, market, and business environment within which a company is operating.

We view it as good practice when the board establishes and maintains a framework of robust and effective governance mechanisms to support its oversight of the company's strategy and operations consistent with the long-term economic interests of investors. There should be clear descriptions of the role of the board and the committees of the board and how directors engage with and oversee management. Disclosure of material risks that may affect a company's long-term strategy and financial value creation, including material sustainability-related factors when relevant, is helpful for investors to appropriately understand and assess how effectively management is identifying, managing, and mitigating such risks.

We seek to understand management's long-term strategy and the milestones against which investors should assess its implementation. If any strategic targets are significantly missed or materially restated, we find it helpful when company disclosures provide a detailed explanation of the changes and an indication of the board's role in reviewing the revised targets. We look to the board to articulate the effectiveness of these mechanisms in overseeing the management of business risks and opportunities and the fulfillment of the company's strategy.

Where a company has not adequately disclosed and demonstrated that its board has fulfilled these corporate governance and risk oversight responsibilities, we may consider voting against the election of directors who, on our assessment, have particular responsibility for the issues. We assess director performance on a case-by-case basis and in light of each company's circumstances, taking into consideration its governance, business practices that support durable, long-term financial value creation, and performance. Set out below are factors we may take into consideration.

Regular accountability through director elections

To ensure accountability for their actions on behalf of shareholders, directors should stand for election on a regular basis, ideally annually.⁴ Annual director elections allow shareholders to reaffirm their support for board members and/or hold them accountable for their decisions in a timely manner. When board members are not elected annually, in our experience, it is good practice for boards to have a rotation policy to ensure that, through a board cycle, all directors have had their appointment re-confirmed, with a proportion of directors being put forward for election at each annual general meeting.

⁴ In most markets directors stand for re-election on an annual or triennial basis, as determined by corporate law, market regulation or voluntary best practice.

Effective board composition

Regular director elections also give boards the opportunity to adjust their composition in an orderly way to reflect developments in the company's strategy and the market environment. In our view, it is beneficial for new directors to be brought onto the board periodically to refresh the group's thinking, while supporting both continuity and appropriate succession planning. We consider the average overall tenure of the board and seek a balance between the knowledge and experience of longer-serving directors and the fresh perspectives of directors who joined more recently.

We encourage companies to regularly review the effectiveness of their board (including its size), and assess directors nominated for election in the context of the composition of the board as a whole. In our view, the company's assessment should consider a number of factors, including each director's independence and time commitments, as well as the breadth and relevance of director experiences and skillsets, and how these collectively contribute to the board's effectiveness in advising and overseeing management in delivering long-term financial returns.

Director independence — from management, significant shareholders, or other related parties — is a central tenet of sound corporate governance across markets.⁵ We encourage boards to have a sufficient number of independent directors, free from conflicts of interest or undue influence, to ensure objectivity in the decision-making of the board and its ability to oversee management. We generally consider it good practice for independent directors to make a majority of the board, or in the case of controlled companies, at least one-third.

Common impediments to independence may include but are not limited to:

- Current or recent employment at the company or a subsidiary
- Being, or representing, a shareholder with a substantial shareholding in the company
- Interlocking directorships
- Having any other interest, business, or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with a director's ability to act in the best interests of the company and shareholders

In our experience, boards are most effective at overseeing and advising management when there is a senior, independent board leader. This director may chair the board, or, where the chair is also the CEO (or is otherwise not independent), be designated as a lead independent director. The role of this director is to enhance the effectiveness of the independent members of the board through shaping the agenda, ensuring adequate information is provided to the board, and encouraging independent director participation in board deliberations. The lead independent director or another appropriate director should be available to meet with shareholders in those situations where an independent director is best placed to explain and contextualize a company's approach.

There are matters for which the board has responsibility that may involve a conflict of interest for executives or for affiliated directors or require additional focus. It is our view that objective oversight of such matters is best achieved when the board forms committees with a majority of independent directors, depending on market norms and a company's ownership structure. In many markets, these committees of the board specialize in audit, director nominations, and compensation matters. An ad hoc committee

⁵ Please see: Tokyo Stock Exchange. "[Japan's Corporate Governance Code](#)." June 11, 2021; Financial Reporting Council. "[UK Corporate Governance Code](#)." July 16, 2018; Investor Stewardship Group. "Corporate Governance Principles for US Listed Companies."

might also be formed to decide on a special transaction, particularly one involving a related party, or to investigate a significant adverse event.

When nominating directors to the board, we look to companies to provide sufficient information on the individual candidates so that shareholders can assess the capabilities and suitability of each individual nominee and their fit within overall board composition. These disclosures should give an understanding of how the collective experience and expertise of the board, as well as the particular skill sets of individual directors, aligns with the company's long-term strategy and business model. Highly qualified, engaged directors with professional characteristics relevant to a company's business and strategy enhance the ability of the board to add value and be the voice of shareholders in board discussions.

It is in this context that we are interested in a variety of experiences, perspectives, and skillsets in the board room. We see it as a means of promoting diversity of thought to avoid "group think" in the board's exercise of its responsibilities to advise and oversee management.

In assessing board composition, we take a case-by-case approach based on a company's board size, business model, strategy, location and market capitalization. We look for companies to explain how their approach to board composition supports the company's governance practices.

We note that in many markets, policymakers have set board gender diversity goals which we may discuss with companies, particularly if there is a risk their board composition may be misaligned. We ask boards to disclose, consistent with local laws, how diversity, including professional and personal characteristics, is considered in board composition, given the company's long-term strategy and business model.⁶

Sufficient capacity

As the role and expectations of a director are increasingly demanding, directors must be able to commit an appropriate amount of time to board and committee matters. It is important that directors have the capacity to meet all of their responsibilities – including when there are unforeseen events – and therefore, they should not take on an excessive number of roles that would impair their ability to fulfill their duties.

Auditors and audit-related issues

BlackRock recognizes the critical importance of financial statements, which should provide a true and fair picture of a company's financial condition. Accordingly, we look for the assumptions made by management and reviewed by the auditor in preparing the financial statements to be reasonable and justified.

The accuracy of financial statements, inclusive of financial and non-financial information as required or permitted under market-specific accounting rules, is of paramount importance to BlackRock. Investors increasingly recognize that a broader range of risks and opportunities have the potential to materially impact financial performance. Over time, we anticipate investors and other users of company reporting will increasingly seek to understand and scrutinize the assumptions underlying financial statements, particularly those that pertain to the impact of the transition to a low-carbon economy on a company's business model and asset mix. We recognize that this is an area of evolving practice and note that international standards setters, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Board

⁶ Personal characteristics may include, but are not limited to, gender; race/ethnicity; disability; veteran status; LGBTQ+; and national, Indigenous, religious, or cultural identity.

and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), continue to develop their guidance to companies.⁷

In this context, audit committees, or equivalent, play a vital role in a company's financial reporting system by providing independent oversight of the accounts, material financial and, where appropriate to the jurisdiction, non-financial information and internal control frameworks. Moreover, in the absence of a dedicated risk committee, these committees can provide oversight of Enterprise Risk Management systems.⁸ In our view, effective audit committee oversight strengthens the quality and reliability of a company's financial statements and provides an important level of reassurance to shareholders.

Audit committees or equivalent should have clearly articulated charters that set out their responsibilities and have a rotation plan in place that allows for a periodic refreshment of the committee membership to introduce fresh perspectives to audit oversight. We recognize that audit committees will rely on management, internal audit, and the independent auditor in fulfilling their responsibilities but look to committee members to demonstrate they have relevant expertise to monitor and oversee the audit process and related activities.

We take particular note of unexplained changes in reporting methodology, cases involving significant financial restatements, or ad hoc notifications of material financial weakness. In this respect, audit committees should provide timely disclosure on the remediation of Key and Critical Audit Matters identified either by the external auditor or internal audit function.

The integrity of financial statements depends on the auditor being free of any impediments to being an effective check on management. To that end, it is important that auditors are, and are seen to be, independent. Where an audit firm provides services to the company in addition to the audit, we look for the fees earned to be disclosed and explained. We look for Audit committees to have in place a procedure for assessing annually the independence of the auditor and the quality of the external audit process.

Comprehensive disclosure provides investors with a sense of the company's long-term operational risk management practices and, more broadly, the quality of the board's oversight. We look to the audit or risk committee to periodically review the company's risk assessment and risk management policies and the significant risks and exposures identified by management, the internal auditors or the independent auditors and management's steps to address them. In the absence of detailed disclosures, we may reasonably conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk.

Capital structure, mergers, asset sales, and other special transactions

The capital structure of a company is critical to shareholders as it impacts the value of their investment and the priority of their interest in the company relative to that of other equity or debt investors. Pre-emptive rights are a key protection for shareholders against the dilution of their interests.

⁷ IFRS, "IFRS S1 General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information", June 2023, and IAASB, "IAASB Launches Public Consultation on Landmark Proposed Global Sustainability Assurance Standard", August 2023.

⁸ Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by the entity's board of directors, management, and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within the risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives. Please see the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), "Enterprise Risk Management", 2023.

Effective voting rights are basic rights of share ownership and a core principle of effective governance. Shareholders, as the residual claimants, have the strongest interest in protecting the financial value of the company, and voting rights should match economic exposure, i.e. one share, one vote.

In principle, we disagree with the creation of a share class with equivalent economic exposure and preferential, differentiated voting rights. In our view, this structure violates the fundamental corporate governance principle of proportionality and results in a concentration of power in the hands of a few shareholders, thus disenfranchising other shareholders and amplifying any potential conflicts of interest. However, we recognize that in certain markets, at least for a period of time, companies may have a valid argument for listing dual classes of shares with differentiated voting rights. In our view, such companies should review these share class structures on a regular basis or as company circumstances change. Additionally, they should seek shareholder approval of their capital structure on a periodic basis via a management proposal at the company's shareholder meeting. The proposal should give unaffiliated shareholders the opportunity to affirm the current structure or establish mechanisms to end or phase out controlling structures at the appropriate time, while minimizing costs to shareholders.

In assessing mergers, asset sales, or other special transactions, BlackRock's primary consideration is the long-term economic interests of our clients as shareholders. Boards proposing a transaction should clearly explain the economic and strategic rationale behind it. We will review a proposed transaction to determine the degree to which it can enhance long-term shareholder value. We find long-term investors like our clients typically benefit when proposed transactions have the unanimous support of the board and have been negotiated at arm's length. We may seek reassurance from the board that the financial interests of executives and/or board members in a given transaction have not adversely affected their ability to place shareholders' interests before their own. Where the transaction involves related parties, the recommendation to support should come from the independent directors, a best practice in most markets, and ideally, the terms should have been assessed through an independent appraisal process. In addition, it is good practice that it be approved by a separate vote of the non-conflicted parties.

As a matter of sound governance practice, shareholders should have a right to dispose of company shares in the open market without unnecessary restriction. In our view, corporate mechanisms designed to limit shareholders' ability to sell their shares are contrary to basic property rights. Such mechanisms can serve to protect and entrench interests other than those of the shareholders. In our view, shareholders are broadly capable of making decisions in their own best interests. We encourage any so-called "shareholder rights plans" proposed by a board to be subject to shareholder approval upon introduction and periodically thereafter.

Executive compensation

In most markets, one of the most important roles for a company's board of directors is to put in place a compensation structure that incentivizes and rewards executives appropriately. Executive compensation is an important tool used by companies to support long-term financial value creation. In our experience, well-structured compensation policies reward the successful delivery of strategic, operational, and/or financial goals, encourage an appropriate risk appetite, and align the interests of shareholders and executives through equity ownership.

We look for there to be a clear link between variable pay and operational and financial performance. Performance metrics should be stretching and aligned with a company's strategy and business model. BIS does not have a position on whether companies should use sustainability-related criteria in compensation structures, but, where they are included, we look to companies to be as rigorous as they

would be in setting other financial or operational targets. Long-term incentive plans should encompass timeframes that 1) are distinct from annual executive compensation structures and metrics, and 2) encourage the delivery of strong financial results over a period of years.

When designing, reviewing, and approving executive compensation policies, board compensation committees – or board members responsible for setting executive compensation – should carefully consider the company’s specific circumstances, such as its risk profile, the environment in which it operates, and the individuals the board is trying to attract, retain and incentivize. We look to the compensation committees to guard against contractual arrangements that would entitle executives to material compensation for early termination of their employment. Finally, pension contributions and other deferred compensation arrangements should be reasonable in light of market practices or the company’s business and executive compensation strategies.

We are not supportive of one-off or special bonuses unrelated to company or individual performance. Where discretion has been used by the compensation committee or its equivalent, we appreciate disclosure relating to how and why the discretion was used, and how the adjusted outcome is aligned with the interests of shareholders. We acknowledge that the use of peer group evaluation by compensation committees can help ensure competitive pay; however, we are concerned when the rationale for increases in total compensation at a company is solely based on peer benchmarking, rather than also considering rigorous measures of outperformance. We encourage companies to clearly explain how compensation outcomes have rewarded performance.

We encourage boards to consider building clawback provisions into incentive plans such that companies could clawback compensation or require executives to forgo awards when compensation was based on faulty financial statements or deceptive business practices. We also favor recoupment from or the foregoing of the grant of any awards by any senior executive whose behavior caused material financial harm to shareholders, material reputational risk to the company, or resulted in a criminal investigation, even if such actions did not ultimately result in a material restatement of past results.

In our view, non-executive directors should be compensated in a manner that is commensurate with the time and effort expended in fulfilling their professional responsibilities. Additionally, these compensation arrangements should not risk compromising directors’ independence or aligning their interests too closely with those of the management, whom they are charged with overseeing.

BIS may convey concerns through not supporting management’s proposals to approve compensation, where they are on the agenda. We may also vote against members of the compensation committee or equivalent board members for poor compensation practices or structures.

Material sustainability-related risks and opportunities

It is our view that well-managed companies will effectively evaluate and manage material sustainability-related risks and opportunities relevant to their businesses.⁹ As with all risks and opportunities in a company’s business model, appropriate oversight of material sustainability considerations is a core component of having an effective governance framework that supports durable, long-term financial value creation.

⁹ By material sustainability-related risks and opportunities, we mean the drivers of risk and financial value creation in a company’s business model that have an environmental or social dependency or impact. Examples of environmental issues include, but are not limited to, water use, land use, waste management, and climate risk. Examples of social issues include, but are not limited to, human capital management, impacts on the communities in which a company operates, customer loyalty, and relationships with regulators.

Robust disclosure allows investors to effectively evaluate companies' strategy and business practices related to material sustainability-related risks and opportunities. We find it helpful when companies' disclosures demonstrate that they have a resilient business model that integrates material sustainability-related risks and opportunities into their strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets, including industry-specific metrics. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) standards, IFRS S1 and S2¹⁰ may prove helpful to companies in preparing this disclosure. The standards build on the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) framework and the standards and metrics developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), which have both converged under the ISSB. We recognize that companies may phase in reporting aligned with the ISSB standards over several years. We also recognize that some companies may report using different standards, which may be required by regulation, or one of a number of voluntary standards. In such cases, we ask that companies highlight the metrics that are industry- or company-specific.

We note that climate and other sustainability-related disclosures often require companies to collect and aggregate data from various internal and external sources. We recognize that the practical realities of data collection and reporting may not line up with financial reporting cycles and companies may require additional time after their fiscal year-end to accurately collect, analyze, and report this data to investors. That said, while we do not prescribe timelines regarding when companies make these disclosures, we encourage them to produce climate and other sustainability-related disclosures sufficiently in advance of their annual meeting, to the best of their abilities to provide investors with time to assess the data and make informed decisions.

Companies may also choose to adopt or refer to guidance on sustainable and responsible business conduct issued by supranational organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further, industry initiatives on managing specific operational risks may provide useful guidance to companies on best practices and disclosures. While not a voting item, we find it helpful to our understanding of investment risk when companies disclose any relevant global climate and other sustainability-related standards adopted, the industry initiatives in which they participate, any peer group benchmarking undertaken, and any assurance processes to help investors understand their approach to sustainable and responsible business practices.

Climate and nature-related risk

In our view, the transition to a low-carbon economy is one of several mega forces reshaping markets.¹¹ Our research shows that the low-carbon transition is a structural shift in the global economy that will be shaped by changes in government policies, technology, and consumer and investor preferences, which may be material for many companies.¹² Yet the path to a low-carbon economy is uncertain and uneven, with different parts of the economy moving at different speeds. BIS recognizes that it can be challenging for companies to predict the impact of climate-related risk and opportunity on their businesses and operating environments. Many companies are assessing how to navigate the low-carbon transition while delivering long-term financial value to investors. At companies where these climate-related risks are material, we find it helpful when they publicly disclose, consistent with their business model and sector,

¹⁰ The objective of [IFRS S1](#) General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information is to require an entity to disclose information about its sustainability-related risks and opportunities that is useful to primary users of general-purpose financial reports in making decisions relating to providing resources to the entity. The objective of [IFRS S2](#) Climate-related Disclosures is to require an entity to disclose information about its climate-related risks and opportunities that is useful to primary users of general-purpose financial reports in making decisions relating to providing resources to the entity.

¹¹ BlackRock Investment Institute, "Mega forces: An investment opportunity", 2023.

¹² BlackRock Investment Institute, "Tracking the low-carbon transition", July 2023.

how they intend to deliver long-term financial performance through the transition to a low-carbon economy, including where available, their transition plan.¹³

In our experience, disclosure consistent with the ISSB standards or the TCFD framework can help investors assess company-specific climate-related risks and opportunities, and inform investment decisions.¹⁴ Such disclosures also provide investors with insights into how companies are managing the risks associated with climate change by managing their own carbon emissions or emissions intensities to the extent financially practicable. Recognizing the value of these disclosures, in some jurisdictions, like the U.K, large companies must disclose such climate-related financial information on a mandatory basis, while in other jurisdictions these disclosures are viewed as best practice in the market.

Consistent with the ISSB standards and the TCFD framework, we seek to understand, from company disclosures and engagement, the strategies companies have in place to manage material risks to, and opportunities for, their long-term business model associated with a range of climate-related scenarios. This includes a scenario in which global warming is limited to well below 2°C, considering ambitions to achieve a limit of 1.5°C, the temperature goal recently reaffirmed by G20 members as part of the 2024 Leaders' Declaration.¹⁵

These frameworks also contemplate disclosures on how companies are setting short-, medium- and long-term targets, ideally science-based where these are available for their sector, for scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reductions and to demonstrate how their targets are consistent with the long-term financial interests of their investors.

While we recognize that regulators in some markets are moving to mandate certain disclosures, at this stage, we view scope 3 emissions differently from scopes 1 and 2, given methodological complexity, regulatory uncertainty, concerns about double-counting, and lack of direct control by companies. We welcome disclosures and commitments companies choose to make regarding material scope 3 emissions and recognize these are provided on a good-faith basis as methodology develops. Our publicly available [commentary](#) provides more information on our approach to climate-related risks and opportunities.

In addition to climate-related risks and opportunities, the management of nature-related factors is increasingly a component of some companies' ability to generate durable, long-term financial returns for shareholders, particularly where a company's strategy is heavily reliant on the availability of natural capital, or whose supply chains are exposed to locations with nature-related risks. We look for such companies to disclose how they manage any reliance and impact on, as well as use of, natural capital,

¹³ We have observed that more companies are developing such plans, and public policymakers in a number of markets are signaling their intentions to require them or already have requirements in place, such as Australia, Brazil, and the European Union. We view transition plans as a method for a company to both internally assess and externally communicate its long-term strategy, ambition, objectives, and actions to create financial value through the global transition towards a low-carbon economy. Transition plans are building momentum internationally, with increased focus from policy makers and supervisors, including in the EU, UK, G7, G20, and from the financial industry. While many initiatives across jurisdictions outline a framework for transition plans, there is no consensus on the key elements these plans should contain. We view useful disclosure as one that communicates a company's approach to managing financially material business relevant risks and opportunities – including climate-related risks – to deliver long-term financial performance, which allows investors to make more informed decisions. While transition plans can be helpful disclosure, BIS does not make the preparation and production of transition plans a voting issue. BIS may engage companies that have chosen to publish a transition plan to understand their planned actions and resource implications.

¹⁴ BlackRock, "Global perspectives on investing in the low-carbon transition", June 2023. We recognize that companies may phase in reporting aligned with the ISSB standards over several years, depending on local requirements. We also recognize and respect that some companies may report using different local standards, which may be required by regulation, or one of a number of voluntary standards. In such cases, we ask that companies disclose their rationale for reporting in line with the specific disclosure framework chosen and highlight the metrics that are industry- or company-specific.

¹⁵ In November 2024, G20 members reaffirmed the Paris Agreement temperature goal as part of the [Leaders' Declaration](#). G20 members include the world's major economies (19 countries and two regional bodies, the European Union and African Union), representing 85% of global Gross Domestic Product, over 75% of international trade, and about two-thirds of the world population.

including appropriate risk oversight and relevant metrics and targets, to understand how these factors are integrated into strategy. We will evaluate these disclosures to inform our view of how a company is managing material nature-related risks and opportunities. We rely on company disclosures when determining how to vote on shareholder proposals addressing natural capital issues. Our publicly available [commentary](#) provides more information on our approach to natural capital.¹⁶

Companies' impact on their workforce, supply chains, and communities

In order to advance long-term shareholders' interests, companies should consider the interests of the various parties on whom they depend for their success over time. It is for each company to determine their key stakeholders based on what is material to their business and long-term financial performance. For many companies, key stakeholders include employees, business partners (such as suppliers and distributors), clients and consumers, regulators, and the communities in which they operate.

As a long-term shareholder on behalf of our clients, we find it helpful when companies disclose how they have identified their key stakeholders and considered their interests in business decision-making. In addition to understanding broader stakeholder relationships, BIS finds it helpful when companies discuss how they consider the needs of their workforce today, and the skills required for their future business strategy. We are also interested to understand how the board monitors and engages on these matters, given it is well positioned to ensure that the approach taken by management is informed by and aligns with the company's strategy.

Companies should articulate how they address material adverse impacts that could arise from their business practices and affect critical relationships with their stakeholders. We encourage companies to implement, to the extent appropriate, monitoring processes (often referred to as due diligence) to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts and grievance mechanisms to remediate any actual adverse material impacts. In our view, maintaining trust within these relationships can contribute to a company's long-term success.

Other corporate governance matters and shareholder protections

In our view, shareholders have a right to material and timely information on the financial performance and viability of the companies in which they invest. In addition, companies should publish information on the governance structures in place and the rights of shareholders to influence these structures. The reporting and disclosure provided by companies help shareholders assess the effectiveness of the board's oversight of management and whether investors' economic interests have been protected. As a general principle, we believe shareholders should have the right to vote on key corporate governance matters, including changes to governance mechanisms, to submit proposals to the shareholders' meeting, and to call special meetings of shareholders.

¹⁶ Given the growing awareness of the materiality of these issues for certain businesses, enhanced reporting on a company's natural capital dependencies and impacts would aid investors' understanding. In our view, the final recommendations of the [Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures](#) (TNFD) may prove useful to some companies. We recognize that some companies may report using different standards, which may be required by regulation, or one of a number of other private sector standards. TNFD-aligned reporting is not a voting issue.

Corporate form

In our view, it is the responsibility of the board to determine the corporate form that is most appropriate given the company's purpose and business model.¹⁷ Companies proposing to change their corporate form to a public benefit corporation or similar entity should put it to a shareholder vote if not already required to do so under applicable law. We appreciate when supporting documentation from companies or shareholder proponents proposing to alter the corporate form clearly explains how the interests of shareholders and different stakeholders would be impacted as well as the accountability and voting mechanisms that would be available to shareholders. We generally support management proposals if our analysis indicates that shareholders' economic interests are adequately protected. Relevant shareholder proposals are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

Shareholder proposals

In most markets in which BlackRock invests on behalf of clients, shareholders have the right to submit proposals to be voted on at a company's annual or extraordinary meeting, as long as eligibility and procedural requirements are met. The matters that we see put forward by shareholders address a wide range of topics, including governance reforms, capital management, and improvements in the management or disclosure of sustainability-related risks.

BlackRock is subject to legal and regulatory requirements in the U.S. that place restrictions and limitations on how BlackRock can interact with the companies in which we invest on behalf of our clients, including our ability to submit shareholder proposals. We can vote, on behalf of clients who authorize us to do so, on proposals put forth by others.

When assessing shareholder proposals, we evaluate each proposal on its merit, considering the company's individual circumstances and maintaining a singular focus on the proposal's implications for long-term financial value creation. BIS' evaluation considers whether a shareholder proposal addresses a material risk that, if left unmanaged, may impact a company's long-term performance. We look for consistency between the specific request formally made in the proposal, the supporting documentation, and the proponents' other communications on the issues. We also assess the company's practices and disclosures and the costs and benefits to the company of meeting the request made in the proposal. We take into consideration a company's governance practices and disclosures against those of their peers.

In our experience, it is helpful when companies disclose the names of the proponent or organization that has submitted or advised on the proposal.

We would not support proposals that we believe would result in over-reaching into the basic business decisions of the company, are unduly prescriptive or constraining on management. We take into consideration the legal effect of the proposal, as shareholder proposals may be advisory or legally binding depending on the jurisdiction, while others may make requests that would be deemed illegal in a given jurisdiction.

BIS is likely to support shareholder proposals that request disclosures that help us, as long-term investors on behalf of our clients, better understand the material risks and opportunities companies face and how they are managing them, especially where this information is additive given the company's existing disclosures. We may also support shareholder proposals that are focused on a material business risk that we agree needs to be addressed and the intended outcome is consistent with long-term financial value creation.

¹⁷ Corporate form refers to the legal structure by which a business is organized.

We recognize that some shareholder proposals bundle topics and/or specific requests. Further, the proponent's supporting statement may refer to topics that are not directly related to the request made in the proposal. In voting on behalf of clients, we do not submit or edit proposals or the supporting statements – we must vote yes or no on the proposal as phrased by the proponent. Therefore, when we vote in support of a proposal, we are not necessarily endorsing every element of the proposal or the reasoning, objectives, or supporting statement of the proponent. We may support a proposal for different reasons from those put forth by the proponent, when we believe that, overall, it can advance our clients' long-term financial interests. We typically explain to the company our rationale for supporting such proposals.

Alternatively, or in addition, we may vote against the election of one or more directors if, in our assessment, the board has not responded sufficiently or with an appropriate sense of urgency to a material risk. We may also support a proposal if management is on track, but we believe that voting in favor might accelerate efforts to address a material risk.

BlackRock's oversight of its investment stewardship activities

Oversight

BlackRock maintains advisory committees (Stewardship Advisory Committees), generally consisting of senior BlackRock index investment professionals and/or senior employees with practical boardroom experience. The Stewardship Advisory Committees review and advise on amendments to BIS regional proxy voting guidelines (the Guidelines). The advisory committees do not determine voting decisions, which are the responsibility of BIS.

In addition to the Stewardship Advisory Committees, the Investment Stewardship Global Oversight Committee (Global Oversight Committee) is a risk-focused committee, comprised of the Global Head of Investment Stewardship (Global Head), and senior BlackRock executives with legal, risk and other experience relevant to team oversight. The Global Committee does not determine voting decisions, which are the responsibility of BIS.

The Global Head has primary oversight of the activities of BIS, including voting in accordance with the Guidelines, which require the application of professional judgment and consideration of each company's unique circumstances. The Global Committee reviews and approves amendments to these Principles. The Global Committee also reviews and approves amendments to the regional Guidelines.

In addition, the Global Committee receives and reviews periodic reports regarding the votes cast by BIS, as well as updates on material process issues, procedural changes, and other risk oversight considerations. The Global Committee reviews these reports in an oversight capacity as informed by the Guidelines.

BIS carries out engagement with companies, executes proxy votes, and conducts vote operations (including maintaining records of votes cast) in a manner consistent with the relevant Guidelines. BIS also conducts research on corporate governance issues and participates in industry discussions to contribute to and keep abreast of important developments in the corporate governance field. BIS may utilize third parties for certain of the foregoing activities and performs oversight of those third parties. BIS may discuss complicated or particularly controversial matters with senior specialists internally, on an advisory basis, prior to making a voting decision.

Voting guidelines and vote execution

BlackRock votes on proxy issues when our clients authorize us to do so. We carefully consider proxies submitted to funds and other fiduciary account(s) (Fund or Funds) for which we have voting authority. BlackRock votes (or refrains from voting) proxies for each Fund for which we have voting authority based on our evaluation of the alignment of the voting items with the long-term economic interests of our clients, in the exercise of our independent business judgment, and without regard to the relationship of the issuer of the proxy (or any shareholder proponent or dissident shareholder) to the Fund, the Fund's affiliates (if any), BlackRock or BlackRock's affiliates, or BlackRock employees (see "Conflicts management policies and procedures," below).

When exercising voting rights, BIS will normally vote on specific proxy issues in accordance with the Guidelines for the relevant market, as well as the Principles. The voting guidelines published for each region/country in which we vote are intended to summarize BlackRock's general philosophy and approach to issues that may commonly arise in the proxy voting context in each market where we invest. The Guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. BIS applies the Guidelines on a case-by-case basis, in the context of the individual circumstances of each company and the specific issue under review. As such, the Guidelines do not indicate how BIS will vote in every instance. Rather, they reflect our view about corporate governance issues generally, and provide insight into how we typically approach issues that commonly arise on corporate ballots. The Guidelines are reviewed annually and updated as necessary to reflect changes in market practices, developments in corporate governance and feedback from companies and clients. In this way, BIS aims to maintain policies that explain our approach to governance practices most aligned with clients' long-term financial interests. BIS analysts may exercise their professional judgment in determining how to vote if they conclude that the Guidelines do not cover the specific matter raised by a ballot item or that an exception to the Guidelines would be in the long-term economic interests of BlackRock's clients.

In certain markets, proxy voting involves logistical issues which can affect BIS' ability to vote such proxies, as well as the desirability of voting such proxies. These issues include, but are not limited to: i) untimely notice of shareholder meetings; ii) restrictions on a foreigner's ability to exercise votes; iii) requirements to vote proxies in person; iv) "share-blocking" (requirements that investors who exercise their voting rights surrender the right to dispose of their holdings for some specified period in proximity to the shareholder meeting); v) potential difficulties in translating the proxy; vi) regulatory constraints; and vii) requirements to provide local agents with unrestricted powers of attorney to facilitate voting instructions. We are not supportive of impediments to the exercise of voting rights such as share-blocking or overly burdensome administrative requirements.

BlackRock votes proxies in these situations on a "best-efforts" basis. In addition, BIS may determine that it is generally in the interests of BlackRock's clients not to vote proxies (or not to vote our full allocation) if the costs (including but not limited to opportunity costs associated with share-blocking constraints) associated with exercising a vote are expected to outweigh the benefit the client would derive by voting on the proposal.

Voting Choice

BlackRock offers Voting Choice a program that provides eligible clients with more opportunities to participate in the proxy voting process where legally and operationally viable.

Voting Choice is currently available for eligible clients invested in certain institutional pooled funds in the U.S., UK, Ireland, and Canada that utilize certain equity index investment strategies, as well as eligible

clients in certain institutional pooled funds in the U.S., UK, and Canada that use systematic active equity (SAE) strategies. In addition, institutional clients in separately managed accounts (SMAs) continue to be eligible for BlackRock Voting Choice regardless of their investment strategies.¹⁸ BlackRock also launched a U.S. Program to offer proxy voting to eligible shareholder accounts in a U.S. Fund.¹⁹

As a result, the shares attributed to BlackRock in company share registers may be voted differently depending on whether our clients have authorized BIS to vote on their behalf, have authorized BIS to vote in accordance with a third-party policy, or have elected to vote shares in accordance with their own policy. Our clients have greater control over proxy voting because of Voting Choice. BlackRock does not disclose client information, including a client's selection of proxy policy, without client consent.

Conflicts management policies and procedures

BIS maintains policies and procedures that seek to prevent undue influence on BlackRock's proxy voting activity. Such influence might stem from any relationship between the investee company (or any shareholder proponent or dissident shareholder) and BlackRock, BlackRock's affiliates, a Fund or a Fund's affiliates, or BlackRock employees. The following are examples of sources of perceived or potential conflicts of interest:

- BlackRock clients who may be issuers of securities or proponents of shareholder resolutions
- BlackRock business partners or third parties who may be issuers of securities or proponents of shareholder resolutions
- BlackRock employees who may sit on the boards of public companies held in Funds managed by BlackRock
- Significant BlackRock, Inc. investors who may be issuers of securities held in Funds managed by BlackRock
- Securities of BlackRock, Inc. or BlackRock investment funds held in Funds managed by BlackRock
- BlackRock, Inc. board members who serve as senior executives or directors of public companies held in Funds managed by BlackRock

BlackRock has taken certain steps to mitigate perceived or potential conflicts including, but not limited to, the following:

- Adopted the Guidelines which are designed to advance our clients' long-term economic interests in the companies in which BlackRock invests on their behalf
- Established a reporting structure that separates BIS from employees with sales, vendor management, or business partnership roles. In addition, BlackRock seeks to ensure that all engagements with corporate issuers, dissident shareholders or shareholder proponents are managed consistently and without regard to BlackRock's relationship with such parties. Clients or business partners are not given special treatment or differentiated access to BIS. BIS prioritizes engagements based on factors including, but not limited to, our need for additional information to make a voting decision or our view

¹⁸ With Voting Choice, SMAs have the ability to select from a set of voting policies from third-party proxy advisers the policy that best aligns with their views and preferences. BlackRock can then use its proxy voting infrastructure to cast votes based on the client's selected voting policy.

¹⁹ Read more about BlackRock Voting Choice on our [website](#).

on the likelihood that an engagement could lead to positive outcome(s) over time for the economic value of the company. Within the normal course of business, BIS may engage directly with BlackRock clients, business partners and/or third parties, and/or with employees with sales, vendor management, or business partnership roles, in discussions regarding our approach to stewardship, general corporate governance matters, client reporting needs, and/or to otherwise ensure that proxy-related client service levels are met

- Determined to engage, in certain instances, an independent third-party voting service provider to make proxy voting recommendations as a further safeguard to avoid potential conflicts of interest, to satisfy regulatory compliance requirements, or as may be otherwise required by applicable law. In such circumstances, the independent third-party voting service provider provides BlackRock with recommendations, in accordance with the Guidelines, as to how to vote such proxies. BlackRock uses an independent third-party voting service provider to make proxy voting recommendations for shares of BlackRock, Inc. and companies affiliated with BlackRock, Inc. BlackRock may also use an independent third-party voting service provider to make proxy voting recommendations for:
 - public companies that include BlackRock employees on their boards of directors
 - public companies of which a BlackRock, Inc. board member serves as a senior executive or a member of the board of directors
 - public companies that are the subject of certain transactions involving BlackRock Funds
 - public companies that are joint venture partners with BlackRock, and
 - public companies when legal or regulatory requirements compel BlackRock to use an independent third-party voting service provider

In selecting an independent third-party voting service provider, we assess several characteristics, including but not limited to: independence, an ability to analyze proxy issues and make recommendations in the economic interest of our clients in accordance with the Guidelines, reputation for reliability and integrity, and operational capacity to accurately deliver the assigned recommendations in a timely manner. We may engage more than one independent third-party voting service provider, in part to mitigate potential or perceived conflicts of interest at a single voting service provider. The Global Committee appoints and reviews the performance of the independent third-party voting service providers, generally on an annual basis.

Securities lending

When so authorized, BlackRock acts as a securities lending agent on behalf of Funds. Securities lending is a well-regulated practice that contributes to capital market efficiency. It also enables funds to generate additional returns while allowing fund providers to keep fund expenses lower.

With regard to the relationship between securities lending and proxy voting, BlackRock cannot vote shares on loan and may determine to recall them for voting, as guided by our fiduciary duty as an asset manager to our clients in helping them achieve their investment goals. While this has occurred in a limited number of cases, the decision to recall securities on loan as part of BlackRock's securities lending program in order to vote is based on an evaluation of various factors that include, but are not limited to, assessing potential securities lending revenue alongside the potential long-term financial value to clients

of voting those securities (based on the information available at the time of recall consideration).²⁰ BIS works with colleagues in the Securities Lending and Risk and Quantitative Analysis teams to evaluate the costs and benefits to clients of recalling shares on loan.

In almost all instances, BlackRock anticipates that the potential long-term financial value to the Fund of voting shares would be less than the potential revenue the loan may provide the Fund. However, in certain instances, BlackRock may determine, in our independent business judgment as a fiduciary, that the value of voting outweighs the securities lending revenue loss to clients and would therefore recall shares to be voted in those instances.

Periodically, BlackRock reviews our process for determining whether to recall securities on loan in order to vote and may modify it as necessary.

Reporting and vote transparency

We are committed to transparency in the stewardship work we do on behalf of clients. We inform clients about our engagement and voting policies and activities through direct communication and through disclosure on our [website](#). Additionally, we make public our regional proxy voting guidelines for the benefit of clients and the companies in which we invest on their behalf. We also publish commentaries to share our perspective on market developments and emerging key themes.

At a more granular level, on a quarterly basis, we publish our vote record for each company that held a shareholder meeting during the period, showing how BIS voted on each proposal and providing our rationale for any votes against management proposals and on shareholder proposals. For shareholder meetings where a vote might be high profile or of significant interest to clients, we may publish a vote bulletin after the meeting, disclosing and explaining our vote on key proposals. We also publish a quarterly list of all companies with which we engaged and the key topics addressed in the engagement meeting.

In this way, we help inform our clients about the work we do on their behalf in promoting the governance and business practices that support durable, long-term financial value creation by companies.

²⁰ Recalling securities on loan can be impacted by the timing of record dates. In the U.S., for example, the record date of a shareholder meeting typically falls before the proxy statements are released. Accordingly, it is not practicable to evaluate a proxy statement, determine that a vote has a material impact on a fund and recall any shares on loan in advance of the record date for the annual meeting. As a result, managers must weigh independent business judgement as a fiduciary, the benefit to a fund's shareholders of recalling loaned shares in advance of an estimated record date without knowing whether there will be a vote on matters which have a material impact on the fund (thereby forgoing potential securities lending revenue for the fund's shareholders) or leaving shares on loan to potentially earn revenue for the fund (thereby forgoing the opportunity to vote).

Want to know more?

blackrock.com/stewardship | contactstewardship@blackrock.com

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