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# The flattening that really matters



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The flattening U.S. yield curve is in the spotlight. Is the curve set to invert – and foreshadow a recession as it often has in the past? We explain why comparisons with past flattening episodes may be a case of apples and oranges. And we argue that when it comes to flattening, investors are focused on the wrong curve: It is the flattening in return expectations between low- and high-risk assets that really matters.

## Highlights

- We caution against comparing the shape of today's U.S. Treasury yield curve to the past and using it as a recessionary signal in isolation. Post-crisis ultra-easy monetary policies, a structural rise in risk aversion, and the run-off of maturing bonds on the Federal Reserve's crisis-era balance sheet may make the slope of the yield curve less informative than it has been historically, we believe.
- We highlight a simple historical relationship between the slope of the U.S. yield curve and the "unemployment gap" – a measure of labor market slack. Both have dropped to multi-year lows, consistent with their historical behavior in the latter stage of economic cycles. This argues for building resilience into portfolios.
- The flattening that really matters, in our view, is the one taking place in the securities market line (SML). This shows the risk-return tradeoff across assets. Expected returns on lower-risk assets have risen alongside the Fed's policy rates, reducing the need to stretch for yield into higher-risk sectors. This has triggered volatility in the fixed income market – and underpins our defensive stance: a preference for U.S. short duration and higher-quality credit.

## Market recap

The 10-year Treasury yield tested 3% again in early August. Short-maturity Treasuries have significantly outperformed longer bonds this year to date – as seen in the table below -- reinforcing our preference for the short end.

## Bond market summary

Sector	View	YTD return	Yield	Sector	View	YTD return	Yield
U.S. aggregate	—	-1.50%	3.34%	U.S. municipal bonds	—	-0.11%	2.69%
U.S. government bonds	▼	-1.42%	2.82%	U.S. investment grade	—	-2.35%	3.97%
Short (1-5 years)	▲	-0.33%	2.70%	U.S. high yield	—	1.42%	6.27%
Intermediate (5-10)	▼	-1.88%	2.90%	Bank loans	—	2.99%	5.19%
Long (10+)	▼	-4.56%	3.08%	Securitized assets	▲	-0.85%	3.52%
U.S. inflation protected	▲	-0.48%	3.04%	Euro credit	▼	-0.22%	0.96%
Agency mortgages	—	-0.95%	3.47%	Emerging markets	—	-3.11%	6.28%
Non-U.S. developed	▼	-2.23%	0.97%	Asia fixed income	—	-1.97%	5.01%

▲ Overweight — Neutral ▼ Underweight ↑ Upgrade ↓ Downgrade

**Past performance is not a reliable indicator of current or future results. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.** Source: Bloomberg, as of August 3, 2018. Notes: Performance and yields are represented by the S&P Leveraged Loan Index (bank loans); J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index (EM hard-currency debt), J.P. Morgan Asia Credit Index (Asia fixed income), and the respective Barclays Bloomberg indexes for the remaining sectors. Yields are yield to maturity, except U.S. high yield and municipal bonds (yield to worst). Performance is measured in total returns and in U.S. dollars, except for Euro credit (euros). Our TIPS view reflects relative performance vs. nominal U.S. Treasuries. Indexes used are not intended to be indicative of any fund or strategy's performance.

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## Not your parents' yield curve


The flattening U.S. yield curve has sparked much debate. Is the curve still a useful perceived recession indicator? It has inverted before every recession since WWII, yet we caution against using the flattening yield curve in isolation as a signal. A flatter yield curve was the *intention* of post-crisis ultra-easy monetary policies. Once short-term rates dropped to zero, global central bankers looked to provide further easing by lowering long-term rates. That influence on the long end has yet to fade – even as the Fed normalizes policy. Market anticipation over a Bank of Japan policy tweak that allowed long-term Japanese bond yields to move in a wider range initially led to steeper yield curves globally.

The Fed's gradual balance sheet run-off implicitly is holding down long-end yields. The Fed is maintaining its long-term bond holdings, rather than actively selling them. And it is still reinvesting a portion of its maturing bond holdings, while allowing the rest to run off at maturity. A shift in the mix of issuance has also helped flatten the yield curve as new supply ramps up to fund tax cuts and spending increases. Bills (up to 52-week maturities) made up 42% of gross new issuance in the first half, a turnaround from muted bill issuance in recent years, according to U.S. Treasury data as of end-July. Yet this mix could change. A recent Treasury advisory report suggested issuing more long-term bonds.

Another reason to expect flattening pressures to ease: Net global bond issuance (after central bank purchases) is set to return to positive territory in 2018, driven by the surge in new U.S. paper. See the *Back in black* chart below. Such issuance levels have historically come with a much higher term premium (orange line) – or excess yield compensating investors for holding longer-term bonds. This suggests there could be pressure on the curve to steepen, although a structural rise in risk aversion since the 2008 crisis could slow any rise in long-term rates. See [The safety premium driving low rates](#) of November 2017.

## Back in black


G3 net bond issuance vs. term premium, 2007-2018



Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, with data from Morgan Stanley, July 2018. The orange line is a GDP-weighted average of the term premia of U.S., Japan and Germany 10-year government bonds, based on the ACM model developed by New York Fed economists Tobias Adrian, Richard Crump and Emanuel Moench. Issuance is net of central bank purchases. 2018 figures are full-year estimates.

## Mind the gap

U.S. yield curve vs. unemployment gap, 1953-2018



Source: BlackRock Investment Institute, with data from Bloomberg and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), July 2018. Notes: The teal line represents the (U3) U.S. unemployment rate minus the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), as estimated by the CBO. The yield curve is represented by the gap between 10-year and two-year constant-maturity U.S. Treasury note yields, based on Federal Reserve data. The one-year Treasury yield is used instead of the two-year for pre-1962 curve calculations.

## Beyond the flattening yield curve

What about the link between the yield curve and economic indicators? We find the spread between the 10- and two-year U.S. Treasury yield has historically followed a similar track to the unemployment gap (the difference between the actual and “natural” rate of unemployment – a hypothetical level of unemployment below which inflation rises).

At the trough of the economic cycle, high unemployment tends to lead to a larger unemployment gap. The natural rate changes slowly due to structural forces such as productivity and demographics. Monetary policy is usually highly accommodative in these periods. Short-term rates fall relative to long-term rates, widening the 10- to two-year yield gap (steepening the yield curve). See the *Mind the gap* chart above. Conversely, the yield curve has historically flattened in the latter stages of the economic cycle, as the unemployment gap narrows. The relationship was less stable during the mid-1960s to mid-1980s, due to high volatility of realized inflation. Yet overall, the coincident move in these indicators since the global financial crisis has been consistent with their behavior since the mid-1950s. The unemployment gap has fallen from a peak in 2009 to a 17-year low, as the chart shows, on the back of a strong labor market. And the yield curve has flattened in line with this, also reflecting the Fed's policy normalization.

History suggests the yield curve can stay flat for years before eventually inverting, as it did in the late 1990s. And our [BlackRock Growth GPS](#) still points to steady global growth ahead. The key message: We see reasons to believe the yield curve may be a less useful economic signal than in the past, but with the unemployment gap telling a similar late-cycle story, it makes sense to fortify portfolios.

## A flattening securities market line


The only thing more persistent than the flattening yield curve has been market fears about the yield curve. But this attention may be misdirected. We highlight another “curve” that is arguably of greater importance to investors: the securities market line that illustrates the tradeoffs between risks (volatility) and returns across asset classes.

The two SMLs on the *The other kind of flattening* chart represent the yields of the broad fixed income market, adjusted for risk, for 2012 – in the midst of the Fed’s quantitative easing campaign – and 2018. The 2018 trend line (green) is much flatter than the 2012 line (blue), as yields on lower-risk assets such as U.S. Treasuries have significantly increased alongside the Fed’s interest rate increases. In some cases the volatility of higher-risk assets has climbed, while their yields have fallen (see global ex-U.S. bonds). The result: a flattening of return expectations across the risk spectrum that means investors today have far less incentive to stretch for yield.

For much of the post-crisis period, global monetary policies encouraged an explicit flattening of the SML. A process dubbed “portfolio rebalance” by former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke illustrates how this would help stabilize markets and stimulate growth: As the Fed bids up prices of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities and pushes down their yields (effectively lowering yields on the lower-risk, or “short” end of the SML), investors react by moving out the risk spectrum. Eventually, the Fed hits the zero bound in interest rates (pulling down the yields on the least risky assets to zero or negative) and investors push down the yields of riskier assets. This causes the SML to flatten.

## The other kind of flattening

Fixed income securities market line, 2012 vs. 2018



**Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Indexes are unmanaged. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.** Source: Blackrock Investment Institute based on data from Bloomberg, July 2018. Notes: The chart shows the relationship between the yield and realized volatility of various fixed income assets in December 2012 and July 2018, periods when the “risk-free” rate differed. We use one-year realized total return volatility as a proxy for risk, and yield as a proxy for expected returns. We use the U.S. one-year overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate as a proxy for the “risk-free” rate, and assume zero volatility in this “risk-free” rate. We use Bloomberg Barclays indexes for all asset classes represented, except for U.S.-dollar emerging market debt, for which we use the J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index.

## Building ballast

The critical question today: What happens to markets as this process goes in reverse? We are seeing early signs of a shift. Yields on some perceived “safe” assets, such as short-term U.S. Treasuries, have risen, contributing to bursts of volatility in global fixed income markets. Why? Attractive yields on these assets – now above U.S. inflation – are heating up the competition for capital. As more money pours into lower-risk U.S.-dollar denominated assets, demand for the U.S. dollar has risen – and demand for riskier assets has declined. All else equal, riskier investments need to offer higher returns (meaning lower prices) to appeal to investors.

The renewed appeal of cash is primarily a U.S. story for now. Eurozone investors, for example, still face negative rates at home and a hefty cost of hedging for venturing into U.S. dollar assets. This could change as other central banks such as the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan start winding back their own easy monetary policies.

The bottom line: Portfolio rebalancing in reverse is a tricky process. The Fed’s gradual normalization process and clear signaling of its policy intent are aimed at avoiding financial market disruption. But the volatility we’ve seen so far this year – also a result of rising economic uncertainty driven by trade disputes and potential U.S. economic overheating – suggests a more cautious approach to fixed income investing is warranted. We advocate building ballast into fixed income portfolios. We prefer an up-in-quality stance in credit as an offset to equity exposure in portfolios. And we prefer short-duration debt and floating-rate exposures in this rising interest rate environment.

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